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The Jim Crow Jury
Thomas Ward Frampton*
Since the end of Reconstruction, the criminal jury box has both
reflected and reproduced racial hierarchiesin the United States. In the
Plessy era, racial exclusion from juries was central to the reassertionof
white supremacy. But it also generatedpushback: a movement resisting
"the Jim Crow jury" actively fought, both inside and outside the
courtroom, efforts to deny black citizens equal representation on
criminaljuries. Recovering this forgotten history-a counterpart to the
legal struggles against disenfranchisement and de jure segregationunderscores the centrality of the jury to politics and power in the postReconstruction era. It also helps explain Louisiana's adoption of
nonunanimouscriminaljuries, which remain in use today.
The Jim Crow jury never fell. Over a century later, statesanctioned racial discrimination in jury selection remains ubiquitous,
and the racial composition of juries continues to shape substantive trial
outcomes. This Article examines over 13,000 peremptory strikes in recent
criminal trials in Louisiana and demonstrates that race continues to
drive the selection of jurors. Additionally, by examining the racial
breakdown of 199 recent nonunanimous verdicts, this Article provides
an unprecedented measure of how race enters into jury deliberations:
viewing the same evidence in courtroom settings, black and white jurors
regularly came to starkly different conclusions about guilt and
innocence.
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The legal system's currentpermissive approach to racialbias and
the jury perpetuates this tradition. Recent Supreme Court cases, even
those grantingrelief to criminal defendants, fail to meaningfully grapple
with this entrenched history of exclusion. But aggressive measures to
counter racial bias in the jury system are needed now more than ever; at
the very least, the most overt relics of the original Jim Crow jury eranonunanimousjuries-shouldbe declared unconstitutional.
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INTRODUCTION

On May 18, 1896, the Comit des Citoyens-an Afro-Creole civil
rights organization based in New Orleans-suffered two losses at the
United States Supreme Court. The first was a constitutional challenge
dubbed "the Jim Crow car" case; Homer A. Plessy, a light-skinned
activist handpicked for his role by the Comit6, was facing a
misdemeanor charge for intentionally violating Louisiana's Separate
Car Act. 1 Plessy v. Ferguson, rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to the statute, appropriately occupies a leading place in the
"anti-canon" of American constitutional history. 2
The second case, another criminal appeal stemming from the
same courthouse in Orleans Parish, largely has been forgotten. James
Murray, a black man, was condemned to death by an all-white jury for
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 538-39 (1896).
1.
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 412-17 (2011); see also Richard A.
2.
Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and JudicialDissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998) (examining the role of
dissents-particularly Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy-in the "anti-canon" of constitutional
law).

2018]

THE JIM CROW JURY

1595

murdering a white watchman. 3 The Comit6 funded a legal challenge on
Murray's behalf as part of a larger campaign to oppose the rise of what
the organization called "the Jim Crow jury." 4 Since 1875, federal law
prohibited the exclusion of state court jurors on the basis of race, 5 and
for a short period, these rights were enforced. 6 Two decades later,
however, black citizens' access "into the sanctum sanctorum of justicethe jury box" 7-was sharply curtailed across the South, despite dogged
efforts by activists and frequent legal challenges. Murray v. Louisiana
was typical of these cases: in a short opinion, the Court denied Murray
relief, noting that at least a few black jurors made it into the large pool
of prospective grand and petit jurors.8 Two months later, "crowds fill[ed]
the streets" of New Orleans to catch a glimpse of the botched execution,
during which Murray's hanging body "was racked by spasms and
convulsions" as though "in the throes of electrocution." 9 Murray gasped
for air for over nineteen minutes before finally succumbing. 10 Across the
South, the exclusion of black jurors from the jury box, in tandem with
the exclusion of black voters from the ballot box, served as a key lever
for the reassertion of white supremacy.
Over a century later, the jury box continues to reflect and
reproduce racial hierarchies in the United States. Recent scholarship
illustrates how the legacies of Jim Crow infect and permeate
contemporary criminal justice-from surveillance and policing to mass
incarceration and execution." And, in a reprise of the Comit des
3.
Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1896).
4.
See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
5.
Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336-37.
6.
See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 892-95 (1994) (outlining the Supreme Court's treatment of
rights of jurors following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875); James Forman, Jr., Juries
and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 930-34 (2003) (tracing the sparse
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 across jurisdictions).
7.
William Henry Grey, Address at the Arkansas Constitutional Convention of 1868 (Jan.
7, 1868), in ARKANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONVENTION WHICH ASSEMBLED AT LITTLE ROCK, JANUARY 7TH, 1868, 95-96 (John G. Price, ed.,
1868):

-

Give us our rights as citizens before the law, the right of trial by a jury of our peers,
admit us into the sanctum sanctorum of justice-the jury box,-give us a fair show in
the courts. . . . The idea of giving a negro justice, in a court where . . . the jurors there

assembled are imbued with the animus of the majority of the court in the case of Dred
Scott, and do not believe that I have any right to be protected from the encroachments
of that class looked upon as my superiors!
8.
163 U.S. at 104.
9.
Last of Greasy Jim: His Taking off Proves a Bungling Job, TIMES-DEMOCRAT (New
Orleans, La.), July 25, 1896, at 3.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2011); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD (2017); ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE
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Citoyens' work, a new generation of activists is forcefully arguing for
the centrality of criminal justice reform in the contemporary movement
for civil rights. 12 But the enduring role of racial exclusion in jury
selection-and the stark, outcome-determinative impact of this
inadequately
and
undercontextualized
exclusion-remains
documented.
This Article argues for the salience of these continuities. Part I
presents new archival research resurrecting the lost history of the late
nineteenth-century struggle against "the Jim Crow jury," a movement
across the post-Reconstruction South that contested racial exclusion
from juries. While historians and legal scholars have devoted
and the
significant attention to black suffrage restrictions
implementation of de jure segregation during the Plessy era, the
concomitant battle over the jury box has received significantly less
attention. The social and political meaning of the jury during this
period-and activists' mobilization, both inside and outside the
courtroom, against the exclusion of black jurors-have gone almost
14
and their
entirely unexamined. 13 For both civil rights activists

RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017);
CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (2016); Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015)

(connecting the array of fee, court costs, and assessments in contemporary juvenile and criminal
courts to post-Civil War peonage systems); 13TH (Kandoo Films 2016). For an incisive and
important critique of the limits of "the New Jim Crow" frame, see James Forman, Jr., Racial
Critiques of Mass Incarceration:Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 21 (2012):
The analogy [presented by Michelle Alexander] presents an incomplete account of mass
incarceration's historical origins, fails to consider black attitudes toward crime and
punishment, ignores violent crimes while focusing almost exclusively on drug crimes,
obscures class distinctions within the African American community, and overlooks the
effects of mass incarceration on other racial groups. Finally, the Jim Crow analogy
diminishes our collective memory of the Old Jim Crow's particular harms.
12.

See,

e.g.,

End

the

War

on

Black

People,

MOVEMENT

FOR

BLACK

LIVES,

2018)
24,
June
visited
(last
https://policy.m4bl.org/end-war-on-black-people/
[https://perma.cc/LB9V-E7U2] ("We demand an end to the war against Black people. Since this
country's inception there have been named and unnamed wars on our communities. We demand
an end to the criminalization, incarceration, and killing of our people ..... (emphasis omitted)).
13. The most notable exception is Forman, supra note 6, at 897, who devotes careful attention
to examining "how various parties during the antebellum and Reconstruction eras thought about
juries, and especially how they thought about juries and race." His nuanced study-which
emphasized the jury's centrality in efforts "to protect black victims of white violence"-ends where
this one begins, with the Supreme Court's 1880 decision in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880). Id. For an excellent recent account of the racial politics of civil justice during this era,
including some discussion of black jurors in civil cases, see MELISSA MILEWSKI, LITIGATING ACROSS
THE COLOR LINE: CIVIL CASES BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE SOUTHERNERS 27-110 (2017).

14. This Article uses the phrase "civil rights activists" to refer to the Comitg and others like
them during this period. Although for many at the time, "[t]he right of blacks to serve on juries
was initially conceived, alongside voting, as quintessentially 'political' in nature, and therefore not
guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the Fourteenth Amendment, both of which were
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antagonists in post-Reconstruction America, however, the racial
policing of the jury box was anything but secondary; this Article
underscores the profound symbolic and practical importance of the jury
after the fall of Reconstruction. Particularly as the Supreme Court
evinces renewed interest in issues of racial bias and the jury-as it did
last Term in Peha-Rodriguez v. Colorado15 and the Term before in
Foster v. Chatman16-this research provides some historical context for
the fraught intersections of criminal justice, the jury, and movements
for racial equality in America.
It also solves a historical puzzle with important contemporary
implications. Oregon and Louisiana still allow nonunanimous juries to
return verdicts in serious felony cases." In recent years, there has been
a flurry of scholarly and popular attention devoted to the issue of
nonunanimity in both states," with several scholars observing that the
practice was first adopted in Louisiana at a Constitutional Convention
expressly convened "to establish the supremacy of the white race."1 9 An
Equal Protection Clause challenge to the constitutionality ofnonunanimous verdicts in Louisiana, however, recently failed.'
Although there was "clearly . .. racist intent to disenfranchise African
American voters through the 1898 Constitution," a state appellate court
concluded that the existing scholarship failed to show evidence that the
contemporaneous shift to nonunanimous verdicts was motivated by

understood to protect only 'civil' rights." Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286,
1321 (2012).
15. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
16. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
17. The original enactment in 1898 of Louisiana's nonunanimous jury system provided that
verdicts in cases involving offenses necessarily punishable at hard labor (i.e., serious noncapital
felonies) could be decided by a 9-3 vote. LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 116. A subsequent constitutional
convention in 1974 altered the provision to require the concurrence of ten jurors to return a lawful
verdict. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17. But change may be underway. In May 2018, the Louisiana
Legislature passed Senate Bill 243, proposing to amend the Louisiana Constitution to eliminate
the use of nonunanimous verdicts in criminal cases. The measure will go before voters in November
2018.
18.

E.g., THOMAS AIELLO, JIM CROW'S LAST STAND: NONUNANIMOUS

CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS

IN LOUISIANA (2015); Angela A. Allen-Bell, How the Narrative about Louisiana'sNon-unanimous
CriminalJury System Because Personof Interest in the Case Against Justice in the Deep South, 67
MERCER L. REV. 585 (2016); Bidish Sarma & Robert J. Smith, How and Why Race Continues to
Influence the Administrationof CriminalJustice in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 361 (2012); Kyle R.
Satterfield, Circumventing Apodaca: An Equal Protection Challenge to Nonunanimous Jury
Verdicts in Louisiana, 90 TUL. L. REV. 693 (2016); Adam Liptak, Guilty By a 10-2 Vote: Efficient or
Constitutional?,N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at A10.

19.

Thomas Semmes, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Address at the Louisiana

Constitutional Convention of 1898, in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,
OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA: HELD IN NEW ORLEANS, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1898, at 374 (H. J. Hearsey,
Convention Printer 1898) [hereinafter OFFICIAL JOURNAL].
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hostility toward black jurors.20 This Article's research fills the gap
regarding the Louisiana jury law's original purpose. Across the postReconstruction South, nonunanimity gained political traction as a
mechanism for vitiating the veto power that the occasional minority
juror might wield through his dissenting vote. In Louisiana, where
black jury participation remained relatively robust into the late
nineteenth century, these reform proposals eventually made their way
into law. Understood in its full context, the discriminatory origins of
21
this peculiar jury system are inescapable.
Part II turns to the Jim Crow jury today, offering the most
comprehensive data assembled to date on race, jury selection, and jury
deliberation in U.S. courts. Through an analysis of a new datasetwhich includes information on thousands of Louisiana jury trials (and
over 13,000 individual race-coded prosecution and defense peremptory
strikes)-this Article demonstrates that the systematic exclusion of
prosecutors
While
ubiquitous.
remains
jurors
nonwhite
all
cases, the
in
exclusion
for
disproportionately target nonwhite jurors
disparity is significantly more pronounced in trials involving black
defendants. The data also provide an unprecedented look at the impact
of race in jury decisionmaking: because individual jurors' votes in
nonunanimous cases are occasionally included in court records, the
practical effect of racial exclusion can now be measured in a novel and
20. State v. Hankton, 122 So. 3d 1028, 1037 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
21. This Article does not examine in detail the adoption of nonunanimous jury verdicts in
Oregon, the only other state to employ the practice today, but there are conspicuous parallels to
the Louisiana experience. Oregon adopted nonunanimous juries in the wake of a 1933 murder
prosecution of a Jewish defendant, which controversially ended in a manslaughter verdict-a
compromise resulting from a lone holdout juror. Oregon's leading papers editorialized in outrage:
This newspaper's opinion is that the increased urbanization of American life, the
natural boredom of human beings with rights once won at great cost, and the vast
immigration into America from southern and eastern Europe, or people untrained in the
jury system, have combined to make the jury of twelve increasingly unwieldy and
unsatisfactory.
Editorial, MORNING OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Nov. 25, 1933, at 2 (emphasis added); see also
Modify the Jury Law, STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), Nov. 26, 1933, at 4 (endorsing Morning
Oregonian position and reprinting "southern and eastern Europe" argument). The Morning
Oregonian later cited "the epidemic of lynchings" across the country as further reason to endorse
the change. Jury Reforms Up to Voters, MORNING OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Dec. 11, 1933, at 6.
Although the evidence of discriminatory intent is significantly more circumstantial in Oregon than
in Louisiana, one district judge recently held that "race and ethnicity was a motivating factor in
the passage of [Ballot Measure] 302-33 [adopting nonunanimous verdicts in Oregon], and that the
measure was intended, at least in part, to dampen the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious
minorities on Oregon juries." Oregon v. Williams, No. 15CR58698, at *16 (Multnomah Co. Cir. Ct.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/20171l/Downloads/
(Opinion and Order),
2016)
15,
Dec.
CommitteeMeetingDocument/138793 [https://perma.cc/2G8B-MFXW]. The judge stopped short of
declaring the law unconstitutional, however, for want of "direct evidence of a disparate impact on
minorities of non-unanimous juries" and "how minority viewpoint jurors under a 10-2 system
equate to racial minority jurors." Id. at *29. But see infra Part II.
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illuminating way. In 199 serious felony "guilty" verdicts reached by
racially mixed, nonunanimous juries, black jurors were vastly
overrepresented among those jurors holding out for an acquittal. This
research thus confirms a large body of social science literature
suggesting that race matters in the jury box. It also provides proof of
the "empty-vote" hypothesis, which posits that nonunanimous-decision
rules quietly threaten "to deprive individuals with diverse views who
actually serve on juries from exercising any real voting power." 2 2 The
absence of a unanimity requirement continues to systematically
weaken the voice of nonwhite jurors in contemporary criminal
adjudication, just as it was originally intended.
Part III concludes by considering the doctrinal and policy
implications of the foregoing analysis. At the most basic level, this study
underscores the century-long failure of U.S. law to ensure racial equity
in the jury box. While the Court has affirmed, in various formulations,
the criminal defendant's right "to be tried by a jury whose members are
selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria" for over a century, 23 it
has never developed a doctrinal framework that robustly protects this
guarantee. Indeed, many of the same criticisms levied against Batson
v. Kentucky and its progeny were made by civil rights advocates in the
late nineteenth century. But judges alone are not to blame. Almost
entirely overlooked in the voluminous literature on Batson and its
progeny is the fact that the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race has
been a federal crime since 1875, although it has been well over a century
since anyone has been charged under the statute. This Part also
explains that while Louisiana and Oregon's nonunanimous jury
systems have been challenged unsuccessfully on due process grounds, 24
the evidence amassed in this Article-original discriminatory intent
coupled with contemporary disparate impact 25-points toward their
invalidity under the Equal Protection Clause.
I. THE JIM CROW JURY, 1877-1900
In January 1900, Senator Samuel McEnery of Louisiana took to
the Senate floor to defend his home state's controversial new
22. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations,113 HARv. L. REV. 1261, 1263
(2000).
23. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986).
24. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
25. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution.").
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constitution. Eighteen months earlier, while delegates in New Orleans
were drafting its provisions, McEnery had cautioned his colleagues
against overexuberance in their efforts to curtail black political powerpredicting the "grossly unconstitutional" suffrage provisions would
result "in our los[s] of representation in Congress." 26 Now, the Senator
rallied to the document's defense. What Northern moralizers failed to
appreciate, he argued, was the "hell-born dream" of Reconstruction,
"the darkest and most shameful period in the history of the human
race." 2 7 Among the gravest indignities suffered under this "reign of
terror" was that "[t]he courts as a rule were corrupt. Negro jurors were
impaneled, and no white man had an opportunity in criminal cases for
a fair trial." 2 8

While McEnery's fever dream of "negro domination" was
hyperbole-at no time did Louisiana's black majority wield the political
clout he ascribed to it-his anxiety over black jurors is telling. Both
black and white Southerners conceived black jury service "as a form of
political officeholding," and for many white Southerners the practice
"was even more objectionable than black suffrage." 29 For several
decades, the battle to integrate the jury box was a critical and constant
feature of Southern politics.
A. The Integrated Jury after Reconstruction
The Civil Rights Act of 1875,30 the final and furthest reaching
piece of Reconstruction civil rights legislation, represented an
unprecedented encroachment of federal power into arenas that were
previously the exclusive purview of the states. Historians and legal
scholars sometimes write that the Act was invalidated by the Civil
Rights Cases in 1883,31 but this description is imprecise. In those cases,
the Court held unconstitutional Sections 1 and 2 of the Act, which had
outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations. It expressly

26. Don't Adopt the Fifth Section, TIMES-DEMOCRAT (New Orleans, La.), Mar. 18, 1898, at 4;
accord U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
33 CONG. REC. 1063 (1900).
Id.
29. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 39 (2004); accord JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY:
CIVIL WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN LAW 145 (2006).
27.
28.

30. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 335-37.
31. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For such mischaracterizations, see, for example, James M. McPherson,
Abolitionists and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 52 J. AM. HIST. 493, 510 (1965) ("The Supreme
Court .. . declared the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional in 1883."); Judge Louis H. Pollak,
Foreword, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533, 533 n.4 (1995) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was held
unconstitutional in Civil Rights Cases." (citation omitted)).
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left in place Section 4 of the Act, 32 however, which outlawed racial
discrimination in the selection of juries "in any court . .. of any State"
on account of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 33 As the
Court held three years earlier in Strauder v. West Virginia,34 the
Fourteenth Amendment "bestow[ed] upon the national government the
power to enforce" nondiscrimination guarantees in state courts. 35
Recognizing the pervasive and ongoing prejudice "against the
manumitted slaves and their race," the federal government wielded the
authority to block efforts "intended to make impossible what Mr.
Bentham called 'packing juries,' "36 the manipulation of juror arrays to
produce pliant juries eager to convict.
In parts of the South, black jurors began serving on juries
immediately after the Civil War; 3 7 elsewhere, progress moved more
slowly. In New Orleans in the 1870s, black jurors served on federal
grand juries in rough proportion to their overall population, 38 and in
Washington County, Texas, where black residents made up half the
population, approximately thirty-six percent of petit jurors were black
until the late 1870s. 39 In places where Reconstruction had gained less
purchase, however, such as Savannah, Georgia, "[tihere [was] not a
single instance on record where a Colored juror ha[d] served upon any
jury in this city or County" as of 1876.40 Newspapers across the South
regularly noted the summoning of the area's first black jurors, many
soon after the Court's 1880 ruling in Strauder: Baltimore (1880),41

32. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24 (reaffirming constitutionality of Section 4).
33. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1875 § 4).
34. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880) (invalidating West Virginia jury law
under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also ExparteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349 (1880) (upholding
the constitutionality of Section 4).
35. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
36. Id.
37. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 886 (noting how black jurors began serving in South
Carolina and Louisiana in the 1860s and 1870s); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge:
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 50 (1990) (listing Georgia, Texas, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Louisiana as states where black jurors began to serve after the Civil War). Black juror service
before the Civil War was equally rare in the North. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 884 ("So
far as we are aware, however, the first African-Americans ever to serve on a jury in America were
two who sat in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1860.").
38. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 886.
39. Donald G. Nieman, Black Political Power and Criminal Justice: Washington County,
Texas, 1868-1884, 55 J.S. HIST. 391, 399 (1989).
40. Our Jury Commissioners, COLORED TRIB. (Savannah, Ga.), June 3, 1876, at 2.
41. The FirstNegro Jurors, DAILY SHREVEPORT TIMES (Shreveport, Tex.), May 12, 1880, at 1.
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Atlanta (1880), 42 Louisville (1880), 43 Wilmington (1882),44 and
Birmingham (1883).46 After black jurors were first empaneled in Dallas
in 1885, the courthouse was "besieged by numbers of colored men
anxiously awaiting to be summoned." 46 A Louisiana newspaper shared
bemused sympathy for outraged white Texans: "Evidently our
neighbors have not had as large experience as we of Louisiana in the
matter of negro jurors. We were 'broke in' to it immediately after the
war."

47

Integrating the jury box served several significant purposesfrom affirming the citizenship of those called to serve4 8 to countering
impunity for white purveyors of racial violence 49 -but securing fair
treatment for black defendants was the predominant concern by the end
of the nineteenth century.50 As even white Louisiana publications
42.

The First Negro Juror Empaneled, COLUMBUS DAILY ENQUIRER-SUN (Columbus, Ga.),

July 8, 1880, at 1; General News Items, Sw. CHRISTIAN ADVOC. (New Orleans, La.), July 15, 1880,
at 1.
43. Louisville: Negro Jurorsfor the First Time, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Sept. 8,
1880, at 8.

44. Colored Jurors in Delaware, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1882, at 1 (reporting the first capital
case in Delaware in which a black man acted as a juror).
45. Birmingham, HUNTSVILLE GAzETTE (Hunstville, Ala.), Apr. 28, 1883, at 3.
46. Black Jurymen: Sensation Caused by the Action of a Texas Justice, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL
(Milwaukee, Wis.), Feb. 17, 1885, at 3.
47. Negro Jurors in Texas, DAILY SHREVEPORT TIMES (Shreveport, Tex.), Feb. 19, 1885, at 4.
48. Indeed, black newspapers would often publish the names of prominent community
leaders empaneled as jurors. See, e.g., Personal Mention, WEEKLY PELICAN (New Orleans, La.),
Apr. 4, 1887, at 1 ("Mssrs. J. T. Commagere, James Lewis and Wm. Vigers are on the petit jury for
April in Judge Roman's court.").
49. See Forman, supranote 6, at 916 ("Yet while the need to ensure equal treatment for black
defendants was substantial, the most frequent theme voiced by blacks and Republicans during the
Reconstruction era was the need to protect blacks from becoming victims of crime."); see also
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29-58 (1997) (discussing historical
underenforcement of laws to protect black citizens); Colbert, supra note 37, at 41 (discussing
complete impunity for white murder defendants in Texas in 1865 and 1866).
50. This marks a shift from the predominant view of the jury during Reconstruction that
Professor James Forman explores. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Unquestionably, the
view of the jury as a safeguard against white violence remained, to some extent, during this later
period. See, e.g., Sentiment in Politics, No. 11, DAILY CRUSADER (New Orleans, La.), May 30, 1895
(Xavier University, Desdunes Family Papers, Archives and Special Collections, New Orleans, La.):
The "war is indeed over," when no white man be scarcely punished for deliberate
murder of colored women; when we see seven culprits acquitted on the charge of having
outraged a colored paralytic girl, and the press almost silent on the verdict.
The "war is indeed over" when, in a word, the colored man, who is not allowed to sit
on a jury, has no protection either of life, liberty, property, or pursuit of happiness ....
But, for the most part, the emphasis seems to have shifted during the final years of the nineteenth
century to a view of black representation on jurors as necessary for ensuring some modicum of
fairness for black defendants. One possible explanation is that black jury service was so
substantially curtailed by the 1880s and 1890s that realistically it could not provide a meaningful
deterrent to white violence, even if a smaller number of black jurors still could influence the
outcome in individual cases with black defendants.
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candidly acknowledged, "It appears that in some of the parishes of the
State the hostility to the negro is . . . such . .. that ... juries in these
benighted localities seem to think that it is their bounden duty to render
a verdict of 'guilty as charged,' because the accused has black skin."6

1

More often, though, Louisiana papers bemoaned how a single
"obstreperous colored juror" could hold out for a compromise verdict, 52
or how "the decent members of their race shield [the savages]"
rendering "[a] law trial of . .. negro jurors . . . a farce." 5 3
Black jurors frequently faced the accusation that they showed
untoward leniency toward defendants. An 1894 South Carolina robbery
trial of two black codefendants, for example, ended in a mistrial after
the white jury foreman complained to the judge "that the [lone] colored
member of the jury had drawn the color line" and was holding out for
acquittal. 54 The judge became "aroused," and delivered a pointed
harangue that such conduct would "necessarily lead to the Jury
Commissioners excluding colored people from acting as jurors," since
"[n]o colored man is qualified to serve as a juror who will allow himself
to decide a case on a color line."55 Such juror misconduct was "a great
misfortunate, especially in the interest of colored people, that a colored
man should refuse to agree to a verdict because the party is a negro and
he is one himself." 56 Only after his dismissal was the black juror
permitted to speak: he denied "rais[ing] the color line," and had in fact
voted to convict one of the defendants, but felt satisfied the other (who
had called three alibi witnesses) was innocent.5 7 In Mississippi,
newspapers faulted "the baneful influence of secret societies among our
colored people, when a member of one of them is on trial for a grave
felony, or a capital crime."5 8 Such secretive alliances allowed black

defendants to dodge justice "by putting upon the jury that tries him a
member of his order, thus hanging the jury."59
Accusations of excessive leniency even extended to cases
involving white defendants. In a high-profile 1889 murder trial in South
Carolina, a white defendant accused of murdering a well-known
newspaper editor (and Confederate war hero) raised eyebrows by opting

51. Prejudiced Verdicts, OPELOUSAS COURIER (Opelousas, La.), Oct. 26, 1895, at 1.
52. On the Jury, ST. LANDRY DEMOCRAT (Opelousas, La.), Jan. 25, 1890, at 1.
53. Lynch Law, WKLY. MESSENGER (St. Martinville, La.), Oct. 7, 1893, at 2.
54. The ColorLine Drawn:An UnusualIncident in the Court of Sessions, TIMES & DEMOCRAT
(Orangeburg, S.C.), Oct. 10, 1894, at 6.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The Jury System, DAILY COM. HERALD (Vicksburg, Miss.), June 29, 1887, at 2.
59. Id.
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for a majority-black jury. When the trial ended in a prompt acquittal,
black crowds cheered the defendant's release. A Louisiana paper
howled that such acquittals were inevitable in jurisdictions where
racial justice advocates "ha[d] been able to force the negro into the jury
box. The creators of the negro juror [were] responsible for [the
defendant's] acquittal." 60
To deflect such criticisms, black activists sometimes adopted a
defensive posture, like in one 1899 editorial ("GIVE US A CHANCE
AND SEE") assuring readers that "a jury of colored men would be just
as ready to see a Negro guilty of a crime against a white woman
punished as would a jury of white men." 6 1 And, indeed, the historical
record is replete with evidence of all-black juries demonstrating their
willingness to convict black defendants. 62 The pernicious canard of
black indifference to black criminality (particularly as an answer to
63
black insistence on equal justice) has a long and sordid history. But
other black activists bristled at the limited frame of such rhetoric: "But
slow, we must not say too much, lest we be charged with being 'an
apologist for crime,' even by colored 'leaders.' This at least we have
reason to fear from our experience with the sample of Negro manhood
64
that is becoming current in these days."

B. Fighting the Jim Crow Jury
Strauder's "adventurous holding and egalitarian rhetoric"
marked a high-water point: almost immediately, federal courts
retreated from enforcement of black jurors' rights. 65 Although courts
60. The Best One Yet, WKLY. TOWN TALK (Alexandria, La.), July 20, 1889, at 4. For more on
the McDow trial, see The Verdict in the McDow Case, CHARLOTTE DEMOCRAT, July 5, 1889, at 3.
61. Give Us a Chance and See, Sw. CHRISTIAN ADVOC. (New Orleans, La.), May 4, 1899, at 1.
62. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 43-261, pt. 3, at 368 (1875) (Select Committee on the Condition of
the South) ("[Rep. Marshall:] How were the juries composed [in Shreveport]? [Judge A. B.
Levissee:] They were mixed juries, frequently about half and half. Sometimes I have seen a jury
exclusively of negroes; and the only conviction unqualified that we ever reached in Caddo [Parish]
in a murder case was by a negro jury. [Rep. Marshall:] Of what race was the party tried? [Judge
A. B. Levissee:] He was a colored man; a very plain, clear case. [Rep. Marshall:] What became of
the accused? [Judge A. B. Levissee:] Governor Warmouth commuted his sentence to the
penitentiary for life. I have never been able to hang anybody.").
63. See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN 11 (2017) ("Far from ignoring the issue of
crime by blacks against other blacks, African American officials and their constituents have been
consumed by it."); Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 911, 916 (1997) ("[I]n my experience, black jurors are happy to send violent black criminals
to prison, because these jurors, like most jurors, have good sense.").
64. Untitled, DAILY CRUSADER (New Orleans, La.), April 16-19, 1895 (Xavier University,
Desdunes Family Papers, Archives and Special Collections, New Orleans, La.).
65. KLARMAN, supra note 29, at 40; see also Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal
Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511, 531-46
(contrasting the original intent of the Civil War Amendments and the exclusionary jury practices
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during the Plessy era sporadically granted relief to defendants alleging
racial discrimination in jury selection-typically when jury
commissioners or judges expressly acknowledged the intentional
exclusion of black jurors-more often they held that defendants failed
to meet an impossibly stringent evidentiary burden of proving
individual malice. 66 Steadily testing the limits of the courts' credulity,
the former confederate states in the 1880s and 1890s "developed and
implemented strategies to disenfranchise blacks and to prevent them
from sitting as jurors."6 7
But there was pushback. In Louisiana and across the South,
retaining access to the jury box was a pressing priority for activists.
Their mobilizations to secure equitable representation-which took
place both inside and outside the courts-underscores the importance
of criminal justice and the integrated jury box for civil rights activists
in late nineteenth-century America. And, as argued in Part III,
appreciating how white Louisianans sought to circumvent this activism
is key to understanding the constitutional infirmity of nonunanimous
juries today.
1. Louisiana
James Murray, nicknamed "Greasy Jim" by the local press, was
arrested for the murder of a private watchman in New Orleans in 1894.
An all-white petit jury was empaneled under a new law vesting judges
and local jury commissioners with greater discretion to select
"qualified" veniremen. When Murray initially objected to the absence of
black jurors on his case, the trial judge reacted with annoyance.
"Colored men are not discriminated against as a race or a class," the
judge asserted, "but because of their lack of intelligence and of moral

in the South following the Civil War); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race
Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1406-14
(1983).

66. KLARMAN, supra note 29, at 39, 41; Colbert, supra note 37, at 69. Focusing exclusively on
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, many studies erroneously conclude that such challenges
uniformly failed. But state courts frequently granted relief, too-albeit generally only when jury
commissioners expressly conceded intentionally excluding black grand or petit jurors. See, e.g.,
Smith v. State, 69 S.W. 151 (Tex. Crim. App 1902) (reversing murder conviction for exclusion of
black grand jurors); Leach v. State, 62 S.W. 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1901) (same); Kipper v. State, 62
S.W. 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1901) (reversing murder conviction for exclusion of black jurors from
both grand jury and petit jury); Whitney v. State, 59 S.W. 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900) (quashing
grand jury indictment for exclusion of black jurors). For a further discussion of such cases, see
Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law: The Negro in the Court-Room,
43 AM. L. REV. 869, 881-83 (1909) (collecting cases).
67. Colbert, supra note 37, at 75; see also MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY:
DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888-1908 (2001).
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standing." 68 (These remarks are conspicuously absent from the
Louisiana and U.S. Supreme Court opinions, which disclaimed any
intentional racial discrimination in Murray's case. 69) The jury returned
a "guilty" verdict after ten minutes of deliberation. 70
The Comit6 took up Murray's cause. In a February 1895
meeting, the group declared that "THE JIM CROW JURY SHOULD BE
FOUGHT TO THE DEATH," and began raising funds to assist
Murray's lawyer.7 1 Updates on the case and their campaign regularly
appeared in The Daily Crusader, the English-French newspaper edited
by Comitd member and lawyer Louis Martinet (who, alongside Albion
W. Tourg6e, was the chief architect of the Plessy challenge). 72
Each week, a new polemic appeared discussing aspects of the
case or advancing different critiques of lower court rulings. The authors
took pains to ensure
that such a crying evil as the partial composition of juries on race lines [did] not pass
unnoticed. The jury system is said to be the "palladium" of our liberty; if that expression
means anything, it should be a symbol of safety and not a "Jim Crow" arrangement where
race prejudice sits in judgment over the destinies of men .... 73

Regardless of Murray's factual innocence or guilt-and there seems to
be little doubt he killed the watchman 74 -the haste of the all-white
jury's deliberations reflected an indifference to the value of black lives:
"Such a [ten-minute] verdict is simply murder under legal forms, and
serves to show what little consideration the average white juror in
Louisiana has for even life, when the possessor is colored." 75 Noting the
robust turnout at a memorial service in New Orleans for the recently
deceased Frederick Douglass, the Daily Crusader exhorted its readers
to heed well Douglass's observation that "the liberties of the American
68. The Question of Colored Jurors, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Mar. 2, 1895, at 3;
accord The Monitor and the Greasy Jim Question, DAILY CRUSADER (New Orleans, La.), May 6,
1895 (Xavier University, Desdunes Family Papers, Archives and Special Collections, New Orleans,
La.) (discussing the judge's statements).
69. See Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101, 108 (1896); State v. Murray, 47 La. Ann. 1424,
1426 (1895).
70. Come Forward, DAILY CRUSADER (New Orleans, La.), Mar. 13, 1895 (Xavier University,
Desdunes Family Papers, Archives and Special Collections, New Orleans, La.).
71. Citizens' Committee, DAILY CRUSADER (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 14, 1895 (Tulane
University, Amistad Research Center, Charles B. Rousseve Papers, 1842-1994, New Orleans, La.).
72. CAROLYN L. KARCHER, A REFUGEE FROM His RACE: ALBION W. TOURGEE AND HIS FIGHT
AGAINST WHITE SUPREMACY (2016).

73. Sentiment in Politics, No. 6, DAILY CRUSADER (New Orleans, La.), May 22, 1895 (Xavier
University, Desdunes Family Papers, Archives and Special Collections, New Orleans, La.).
74. Activists expended considerable energy responding to criticism that Greasy Jim's case
was a poor vehicle for advancing their cause due to the strong evidence against him. Their
response: "What happened to James Murray may happen to one less guilty, and even less
obnoxious." Come Forward, supra note 70.
75. Id.
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people were dependent upon the ballot box, the jury box, and the
cartridge box; that without these no class of people could live and
flourish in this country."7 6
Black activists had no trouble identifying and critiquing the
emerging Equal Protection framework as inadequate to ensure
equitable black participation on juries. While Strauder struck down a
West Virginia law expressly barring black jurors, the Court did not
announce standards for assessing claims of black juror exclusion by
other methods (e.g., administrative decisions screening potential jurors
for adequate "moral standing" or "intelligence").7 7 Particularly when
faced with facially neutral laws vesting discretionary power with judges
and jury commissioners, the courts evinced extreme reluctance to
examine the overall effects of discriminatory practices.7 8 The Court
initially hinted that statistical disparities between the overall black
population (or registered black voters) and black jurors might suffice to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, 79 but over the 1880s and
1890s this mode of analysis all but vanished. This doctrinal approach
augured ill for meaningful integration of juries, as black activists
recognized from early on:
The evil... lay[s] not in the law, but in the danger of its being used for the benefit of
certain individuals, to the detriment of rights . .. and by affinity, against the public good
and general prosperity. . . . Men of a certain color are excluded from the jury service; that
is the case. . . . The law having been made to serve unconstitutional ends, it must be
unconstitutional, or there is no justice in the land. 80

In denying Murray relief, the court was elevating "phraseology
and . .. private opinions" over constitutional rights, turning a blind eye,
to the practical effects of the law and the cumulative impact of biased
individual decisions on overall jury integration.8 1

76.

FREDERICK DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, WRITTEN BY HIMSELF

420 (1882); see also Come Forward, supranote 70; Jim Murray and Sam Mitchell, DAILY CRUSADER
(New Orleans, La.), July 22, 1895 (Xavier University, Desdunes Family Papers, Archives and
Special Collections, New Orleans, La.).
77. See KLARMAN, supranote 29, at 41-42.
78. Id.
79. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880):
[T]hat no colored citizen had ever been summoned as a juror in the courts of the State,although its colored population ... in 1880 exceeded twenty-six thousand, in a total
population of less than one hundred and fifty thousand,-presented a prima facie case
of denial, by the officers charged with the selection of grand and petit jurors, of that
equality of protection which has been secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
80. Not Quite, DAILY CRUSADER (New Orleans, La.), Mar. 6, 1895 (Xavier University,
Desdunes Family Papers, Archives and Special Collections, New Orleans, La.).
81. Id.
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Murray's appeal failed and his execution promptly followed, but
the fight against the Jim Crow jury continued. In 1897, several
potential black jurors were dismissed from a high-profile federal
criminal trial involving the collapse of a bank in New Orleans. One of
these jurors was a light-skinned Creole man named Henry Thezan who,
erroneously "supposed to be a Cuban by those in court," initially made
it onto the jury panel. 82 According to a Democratic paper, the other
prospective jurors soon recognized "that there 'was a nigger in the
woodpile'" and, fearing that they "would have to sit down at table and
sleep in the same room with any negro who might be selected" during
the long trial, passed a note to the judge. 83 The court then addressed
the defense and prosecution and, with the consent of both, told Thezan
that "he 'was excused.' "84
The Comitl sprang into action, convening a "red-hot" meeting to
plan an appropriate response.8 5 Louis Martinet "declared for 'friction,'"
pushing an aggressive response to the latest indignity.86 "We are killed
and lynched and we don't say a word," Martinet insisted.8 7 "Let us have
a little friction. It may be better for us if it comes along."8 8 An "olive
soap colored" reverend concurred: "God only knows when one of us may
have to stand before that court for trial, and God help us if our own race
9
cannot sit in judgment on us." 8
But there were divisions at the meeting, too, as the social
meaning of the jury within the black and Creole communities was
shaped by class. 90 Lafayette Tharp, the leader of the Colored
Laboringmen's Alliance, 9 1 was unlike many of the more refined Creole
leaders at the meeting:
I am not educated as much as you are, but I am as mouthy as a worm. I am a nigger, and
I don't like no mixed breed in blood or politics. I'm a nigger, and I'll never get on that jury

82. The Old Story of Negroes on the Jury-Leads to an Agitation by Some Colored People,
DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 9, 1897, at 3.
83. Negroes After Gurley, TIMES-DEMOCRAT (New Orleans, La.), July 9, 1897, at 9.
84. Id. This account anticipates a more brutal incident in Alabama around 1905. There, a
"Negro was drawn as a grand juror (by mistake) who appeared and insisted upon the court's
impaneling him with other jurors .... [H]e served two days, when he was taken out at night and
severely beaten, and was then discharged on his own petition by the court." Stephenson, supra
note 66, at 885.
85. Negroes After Gurley, supra note 83, at 9.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Accord Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 868 ("Our central theme is that as the jury's
composition became more democratic, its role in American civic life declined. We suggest neither
cause nor effect, merely irony.").
91. See Levee Labor, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Aug. 17, 1896, at 3.
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list-I'm gone, and I don't hev to be tole so. But I don't like it. It's not right, and I'm goin'
to tell McKinley.

)

Tharpe recognized the surpassing importance of the integrated
jury box-perhaps because his agitation as a labor activist brought him
into regular contact with the courts 92-though he harbored no illusions
that he was likely to be called upon to serve. For both white and black
alike, jury service in the late nineteenth century was restricted to a
certain class of "respectable" citizen. (Among those within the black
community occupying a social position sufficiently elevated to serve as
a juror in the 1890s: Homer Plessy.9 3
The proposal to "tell McKinley" prevailed, with the group opting
to lodge a protest in Washington. In January 1898, Martinet traveled
north, where he delivered a formal "Protest of Citizens of Louisiana" 94
and met with Senator William Chandler of New Hampshire (a
prominent Republican and longtime champion of the rights of black
Southerners). The Protest was signed by twenty-one leading residents
and the Baptist Ministers' Conference, which represented forty-five
churches
and twelve
thousand members.
Ensuring
equal
representation on Southern juries, the signatories argued, was
"necessary, Mr. President .. . to check the tide of oppression rising
anew against the citizen of color of our common country." The letter
included a warning about the context in which the political fight over
jurors was unfolding: "We are here upon the eve of a constitutional
convention [in Louisiana], the avowed purpose of which is to
disfranchise the colored citizens . . . ."
2. Nationwide
Such activism was not confined to Louisiana. Even as legal
challenges to "the Jim Crow jury" encountered limited success, civil

92. See, e.g., Lafayette Tharp Lectured: Escapes Severe Punishment from Recorder Hughes,
TIMEs-DEMOCRAT (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 7, 1902, at 14; Negro Money Lender Fined, TIMESDEMOCRAT (New Orleans, La.), Aug. 12, 1903, at 1; Screwmen in Trouble, TIMES-DEMOCRAT (New
Orleans, La.), Feb. 9, 1895, at 7.
93. An 1893 article summarizing courthouse news mentions that juror Homer Plessy was
fined five dollars for returning late from lunch. Contempt of Court, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans,
La.), May 27, 1893, at 6. The case was a civil suit brought by a widow whose husband was killed
on a road owned by the Illinois Central Company. Plessy and the other jurors returned a $5,000
verdict against the railroad. See Damagesfor Plaintiff, TIMES-DEMOCRAT (New Orleans, La.), May
27, 1893, at 10 (noting that the "jury was out only a short while and returned a verdict of $5000
for plaintiff' Delia Jackson); New Suits, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Apr. 13, 1893, at 8
(noting Delia Jackson lawsuit). No mention of Mr. Plessy's then-ongoing battle against a different
railroad is included in the newspaper's coverage.
94.

JOHN W. GRIGGS, PROTEST OF CITIZENS OF LOUISIANA, ETC., S. DOC. NO. 55-114 (2d Sess.

1898) (enclosing original Comitl protest and responding to the Committee on the Judiciary).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1610

[Vol. 71:5:1593

rights activists across the South organized and pressured authorities to
continue integrating the jury box.
In the fall of 1894, Nacogdoches County, Texas was "in a political
broil" over "the question of negro jurors, which has recently been hotly
agitated."9 5 Under concerted pressure and facing re-election, the local
sheriff summoned five leading members of the black community to
serve as jurors, achieving the first mixed-race jury in the area since the
end of Reconstruction. 96 When a local district court judge responded
"that the colored man is not mentally and legally competent" for jury
service, black activists convened a mass meeting inside the courthouse
focused on the upcoming election and "emphasiz[ing] the demands of
the colored voters that the negro be allowed his rights to serve on the
jury."9
Black activists were organizing across Alabama at the same
time. In April 1894, "colored citizens from all parts" met in
Montgomery, where they began drafting a petition to the Governor. Of
their seven requests for relief, five were criminal-justice related: an
anti-lynching law; a colored assistant chaplain for state prisoners; a
separate house of correction "for prisoners of immature years"; the
appointment of a black representative on the Board of Prison
Inspectors; and the appointment of "colored jurors, especially in those
cases where the direct interests of colored citizens are being
adjudicated, so that, in the deliberations of the jury, both sides of the
issue may receive fair and impartial consideration." 9 8 (The other two
demands addressed funding for black schools and the desegregation of
rail cars.) A leading white newspaper commended the overall "tone and
temper" of the petition, but expressed marked ambivalence as to the
final demand: "The question of jurors should be left with the officers of
the law, who are best informed as to the situation and surroundings in
their counties." 99

And in 1899, the country's first national civil rights
organization, the Afro-American Council, issued a call for a nationwide

95.
96.

Color Line in Politics, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS (Galveston, Tex.), Oct. 19, 1894, at 4.
Id.; see also Colored Jurors, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS (Galveston, Tex.), Oct. 4, 1894, at 3

("No negro has served as a juror in this county since the Davis administration.").
97.

Nacogdoches County Politics, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS (Galveston, Tex.), Oct. 23, 1894,

at 4; see also Color Lines in Politics, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Dallas, Tex.), Oct. 20, 1894, at 3
(noting that "the question of negro jurors ... has recently been hotly agitated").
98. A Petitionof Several Prominent Colored Citizens to Governor Oates in Reference to Certain
Matters, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 1894, at 3.

99.

The ColoredMen's Petition, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 1894, at 4.
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"day of fasting and prayer" to protest racial injustice.1 00 The group's
proclamation denounced the advent of "'Jim-Crow' cars" and the
accumulated indignities of "hundreds of minor inconveniences," but
focused mainly on the evils of lynching and the exclusion of black men
from criminal juries:
We are dragged before the courts by thousands and sentenced to every form of
punishment, and even executed without the privilege of having a jury composed in whole
or part of members of our own race, while simple justice should guarantee us judges and
juries who could adjudicate our case free from the bias, caste and prejudices incident to
the same in this country.101

The Council's call was taken up around the country, from New York to
Knoxville. 1 0 2
C. The Adoption of Nonunanimous Juries
When New Orleans activists met in 1897 to plan their response
to Thezan's exclusion from the "bank wreckers" trial, a white state
senator urged moderation. Public agitation addressing "the old race
question" would "fan into a flame all the bitter feelings which are lying
dormant." Most importantly, "the Constitutional convention is to be
voted upon soon, and if you stir up this matter there can be but one
effect, and that effect will not be to the liking of any colored man in
Louisiana." 103 The warning proved prescient. From February to May of
the following year, Louisiana delegates drafted and ratified a new
constitution with voting restrictions that decimated black suffrage.104
While doing so, they also overhauled the state's judiciary and enacted a'
new provision establishing the validity of nonunanimous verdicts for
serious noncapital felonies.

100. Afro-American Proclamation, Solemn and Extraordinary, Sw. CHRISTIAN ADvoc. (New
Orleans, La.), May 11, 1899, at 1; see also SHAWN LEIGH ALEXANDER, AN ARMY OF LIONS: THE
CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE BEFORE THE NAACP 108-16 (2012).

101. Afro-American Proclamation,Solemn and Extraordinary,supra note 100.
102. Day of Fastingand of Prayer:All the Colored Churches in This Country Asked to Pray for
Relief, CHILLICOTHE GAZETTE (Chillicothe, Ohio), June 2, 1899, at 3; Fasting and Prayer for
Negroes, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, June 3, 1898, at 3; Freedom from Mob, ARK. DEMOCRAT (Little Rock
Ark.), June 2, 1899, at 7; News Bits for Busy Readers, DECATUR HERALD (Decatur, Ill.), at 2
("Colored people in various parts of the country observed a season of fasting and prayer for freedom
from mob violence."); Proclamationby Black Men, WASH. TIMES, June. 3, 1899, at 5; The Wrongs
of the Colored People, DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE (Rochester, N.Y.), June 2, 1899, at 6 (reporting
fasting in New York City and other locations). But see Our Remedy, ATLANTA CONST., June 8, 1899,
at 6 (dismissing protests as contained to "negroes ... in some of the states of the north").
103. Negroes After Gurley, supra note 83, at 9.
104. From 1897 to 1904, the number of registered white voters in Louisiana fell from 164,000
to 91,716; the number of registered black voters fell from 130,000 to 1,342. See Michael L. Lanza,
Little More than a Family Matter: The Constitutionof 1898, in IN SEARCH OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW:
LOUISIANA'S CONSTITUTIONS, 1812-1974, 93 (Warren M. Billings & Edward F. Haas eds., 1993).

1612

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:5:1593

The overriding purpose of the convention was not a secret-the
Democratic Party advertised that it sought "the elimination of the vast
mass of ignorant, illiterate and venal negroes from the privileges of the
followed the example set by similar
elective franchise" 1 0 5-and
conventions in Mississippi (1890) and South Carolina (1895).106 Recent

scholarship questioning the origins and validity of Louisiana's
nonunanimous jury has highlighted this fact as proof that the adoption
of nonunanimous juries was racially motivated. 10 7 But the Official
Journal of the Convention of 1898 contains almost no direct discussion
of the issue; the few references to judiciary reforms obliquely reference
"efficiency" and "economy" as justifying the changes. 108 The broader
political context, however, helps demonstrate how the adoption of
nonunanimous verdicts in particular was motivated by racial bias.

Modern proposals to abandon the rule of jury unanimity in
criminal trials date at least to Bentham in the early nineteenth
century, 10 9 but the endorsement of such a proposal in Louisiana first
came in 1893. On January 20, 1893, Convent, Louisiana-"[a] quiet
little town" about fifty miles up the Mississippi River from New
Orleans-was "thrown into a state of wild excitement." 110 Masked
riders approached the parish jail and, with little difficulty, seized "three
terrified negroes" (Robert Landry, Alfred Jewell, and Jack Davis)
awaiting trial for murder and robbery. The mob hanged Landry and
Jewell from the rafters of a nearby shed. According to witnesses,
105. The Following Resolutions, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 4, 1898, at 9
(publishing Louisiana Democratic Party resolution concerning Convention).
106. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (noting Constitutional Convention of
1901 in Alabama "was part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction South to
disenfranchise blacks"); see also J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974)

(discussing the Southern political environment); PERMAN, supra note 67 (studying the steps taken
in several southern states to disenfranchise African American voters).
107. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
108. OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra note 19, at 76.
109. See JEREMY BENTHAM, ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING: AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL
JURIES, PARTICULARLY IN CASES OF LIBEL LAW (1821) (arguing nonunanimity reduces corruption).

Indeed, not all who promoted the abandonment of the unanimity requirement were motivated by
racial bias. For a provocative and thoughtful rereading of the Insular Cases as the product of
Progressive reform and shifting attitudes toward the jury in the Gilded Age (and not just racial
chauvinism), see Andrew Kent, The Jury and Empire: The Insular Cases and the Anti-Jury
Movement in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 375 (2018).
110. Triple Lynching, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 22, 1893, at 1; see also Judge
Lynch: A Mob Visits the Convent Jailof St. James Parish, SHREVEPORT TIMES (Shreveport, Tex.),
Jan. 22, 1893, at 1; Lynching in St. James, TIMES-DEMOCRAT (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 22, 1893,
at 2 (discussing the lynching of three men).
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horsemen then placed a rope around Davis's neck and rode into the
darkness, his dragged body "bump[ing] into stumps, fall[ing] into
ditches and roll[ing] over and over in the muddy road." His corpse was
not recovered.1 1
While stopping short of condemning the Convent lynching
(because "only one side of the question has been published"), the Daily
Picayune's response was noteworthy: it endorsed the adoption of
nonunanimous verdicts as a way of placating those intent on
committing extralegal forms of racial violence. 112 Lynching generally
was deplorable, the paper opined, because "nine times out of ten" jury
verdicts obviated the need for "popular justice." 113 Occasionally,
however, the courts failed to mete out appropriate punishment "due to
the juries themselves."1 14 Juries "too often" returned "not guilty"
verdicts or forced mistrials:
If a criminal can get one partisan on the jury that tries him he can always accomplish a
"hanging" of that body .... [N]ine jurors should be competent to bring in a verdict, and
1 15
so overthrow the power of a single person to disappoint or obstruct justice.

Courtroom "efficiency," in other words, might obviate the need for less
tasteful forms of racial violence.11 6
Other newspapers across the South similarly linked the
unanimity requirement with lynching. In 1894, a Mississippi
newspaper published its proposed "Remedy for Lynching":
The first and most important thing to do, is to reform our weak and contemptible jury
system. We believe as firmly as we believe that these lynchings have occurred, that if the
jury system be so reformed that a majority may bring in a verdict, that lynching will be
117
absolutely prevented.

A North Carolina paper in 1899 made the same point:
The jury system is a dead failure ... the one-man power is permitted to come in and to
set aside the decisions of courts, and to turn out red-handed murderers and beastly rapists

111. Judge Lynch: A Mob Visits the Convent Jailof St. James Parish, supra note 110. But see
A Blach Thief and Assassin, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 26, 1893, at 2 (reporting
Davis, or someone alleged to be him, had been rearrested after escaping the Convent lynching).
112. Put a Stop to Bulldozing, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 1, 1893, at 4.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Cf. Jury Reforms Up to Voters, supra note 21 (highlighting "epidemic of lynchings"-and
immigrants-as rationale for abandoning Oregon's jury unanimity requirement). For excellent
studies of the phenomenon of lynching, see W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW

SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993); PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS
UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA (2001); and AMY LOUISE WOOD, LYNCHING AND
SPECTACLE: WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 1890-1940 (2009).

117. The Remedy for Lynching, DAILY COM. HERALD (Vicksburg, Miss.), Sept. 11, 1894, at 2.
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free and ready to begin again their hellish, fiendish work.
11
lynchings. 8

. .

[Vol. 71:5:1593

. Hence, the increase in

At precisely the same moment that Southern white politicians
labored to curtail democratic opportunities for black voters at the ballot
box, they invoked the rhetoric of democratic self-governance to justify
the disempowerment of black Southerners in the criminal law. On this
view, jury reform was needed to prevent "the total destruction of the
majority principle, which is the principle on which a government of the
people is founded."11 9
Such calls for jury reform sometimes left implied that it was
black jurors who wielded "the one-man power" to thwart convictions;
more often it was explicit. One of the first calls for the adoption of
nonunanimity in the South came from a Mississippi newspaper, which
began championing a two-thirds majority rule in criminal cases as early
as 1887.120 "In the present condition of affairs," the newspaper
explained, "with two races to select from, it is next to impossible to get
twelve men to convict." 121 While the time-honored tradition of jury
unanimity might make sense in some locales,
[t]he people of the Southern States [were] contending with difficulties such as no people
on earth ever contended with before. We have among us a race of people entire dissimilar
in every respect from the race which furnished our juries before the war. . . . [Tlhe jury
system, with juries chosen from both races and unanimous verdicts required, is a
failure .... 122

Likewise, newspapers in North Carolina complained, 'You can put one
negro on a jury in such a case and he will tie the jury every time and
prevent a verdict.

. .

. Why not have nine of the twelve agreed rather

all?" 123

By the end of the nineteenth century, at least in those
than
states where black jurors were still occasionally empaneled, many
white Southerners agreed that "[t]he jury system must be radically
124
changed in the south if the negroes are to be continued as jurymen."

118. The Georgia Baptists on Lynchings and Crimes, SEMI-WKLY. MESSENGER (Wilmington,
N.C.), Apr. 14, 1899, at 2; accord A Reform Needed, VICKSBURG DISPATCH (Vicksburg, Miss.), Feb.
9, 1898, at 2 ("[W]e do assert, that lynching, as well as all other forms of lawlessness, could be
reduced to the smallest limits, if the jury system was founded on common sense . .. ).
119. Must be Reformed, DAILY COM. HERALD (Vicksburg, Miss.), Jan. 4, 1887, at 2; see also
Levinson, supra note 14, at 1321 (discussing the historical purpose of a jury).
120. See Doubly Injured, DAILY COM. HERALD (Vicksburg, Miss.), Mar. 19, 1887, at 2.
121. Id.; accord Must Be Reformed, supra note 119 (promoting nonunanimity while noting
"[tihe Reconstruction Acts gave the right of suffrage and the right to serve on juries to a densely
ignorant population").
122. Jury Trials, DAILY COM. HERALD (Vicksburg, Miss.), Apr. 3, 1887, at 4.
123. Criticised as to the Jury System, SEMI-WKLY. MESSENGER (Wilmington, N.C.), Aug. 4,
1899, at 4.
124. A Most ImportantMatterfor the South, SEMI-WKLY. MESSENGER (Wilmington, N.C.), Jan.
7, 1898, at 4.
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It was in this context that Louisiana delegates met in 1898 to
rewrite the state's constitution. The Constitutional Convention of 1898,
like similar conventions held throughout the South during this
period, 125 was convened with a single overriding goal: "[T]o protect the
purity of the ballot box, and to perpetuate the supremacy of the AngloSaxon race in Louisiana." 126 The chief point of contention was how best
to craft a suffrage law to achieve these ends. At the outset, the
convention's president, Ernest B. Kruttschnitt, 12 7 signaled his
flexibility: "I favor the plan which will eliminate the largest number of
negroes and the smallest number of white men from the electorate of
this State." 128 Eventually delegates struck a compromise between
competing proposals that combined literacy and property requirements
with a "grandfather clause"-a proviso preserving the franchise of those
Louisianans "entitled to vote" on or before January 1, 1867 and their
male descendants 12 9-thus ensuring that poor and illiterate white men
could still vote. Closing the convention, Thomas Semmes, 13 0 the
Judiciary Committee's chairman, celebrated the body's work:
What have we done? We met here to establish the supremacy of the white race, and the
white race constitutes the Democratic Party of this State. . . . Our mission was, in the first
place, to establish the supremacy of the white race in this State to the extent to which it
could be legally and constitutionally done. 131

125. See C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH,

1877-1913, 321-49 (1971)

(discussing the jury system of the South from the end of Reconstruction to the beginning of World
War I).
126. E.B. Kruttschnitt, President, Closing Address at the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention of 1898, in OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra note 19, at 381; E.B. Kruttschnitt, President,
Opening Address at the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1898, in OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra
note 19, at 10:
May this hall, where, thirty-two years ago, the negro first entered upon the unequal
contest for supremacy, and which has been reddened with his blood, now witness the
evolution of our organic law which will establish the relations between the races upon
an everlasting foundation of right and justice. (Applause.)
127. Kruttschnitt was a leading Democratic political figure in Louisiana. As a younger man,
he participated in the Battle of Liberty Place as a member of the paramilitary organization, the
White League, that violently overthrew Louisiana's Reconstruction government for several days
in 1874. See Lawrence N. Powell, Reinventing Tradition:Liberty Place, HistoricalMemory, and
Silk-Stocking Vigilantism in New Orleans Politics, in FROM SLAVERY TO EMANCIPATION IN THE

ATLANTIC WORLD 127 (Sylvia R. Frey & Betty Wood eds., 1999).
128. Democracy's Campaign, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 4, 1898, at 8.
129.

LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 197,

§ 5.

130. Semmes was a leading legal figure in Louisiana and the President of the American Bar
Association in 1886. During the Civil War, he helped draft Louisiana's articles of secession and
served as a Louisiana senator in the Senate of the Confederate States of America. See DEMOCRATIC
STATE CENT. COMM. OF LA., THE CONVENTION OF '98: A COMPLETE WORK ON THE GREATEST
POLITICAL EVENT IN LOUISIANA'S HISTORY 38-39 (1898).

131. OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra note 19, at 375. All but two (one Republican and one Populist)
of the convention's 134 delegates were Democrats. See Lanza, supra note 104.
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Or as Kruttschnitt put it: "Whilst not every line of it has met my
approval ... [d]oesn't it let the white man vote, and doesn't it stop the
negro from voting, and isn't that what we came here for?" 132
But convention delegates operated within some (minimal) legal
constraints. Louisiana Democrats were acutely aware that an outright
ban on black voters or black jurors would not withstand constitutional
scrutiny, and that race-neutral language could be deployed to achieve
similar ends.133 Even taking such precautions, delegates worried their
efforts had gone too far. In March, the convention nearly ground to a
halt when Louisiana's U.S. Senators, both Democrats, warned that the
draft suffrage provision was unconstitutional. 134 Senator Donelson
Caffery warned that the "grandfather clause" was infirm "because in
fact it discriminates against the colored people of Louisiana"; Senator
McEnery predicted that "if adopted the effect will be to lose in our
representation in Congress and in the electoral vote of the State." 13 5 The
senators ultimately underestimated the willingness of their colleagues
and the courts to accommodate even the most thinly veiled racial
discrimination. 1 3 6 But the convention's careful attention to deploying
"race-neutral" language to accomplish black disempowerment is telling.
It was not only with respect to suffrage that Democrats feared
federal involvement; racial discrimination in Louisiana jury selection,
in particular, was also under federal scrutiny at the time. After
Martinet's visit with Senator Chandler in January 1898, the latter
forwarded the Comit6's protest to the Senate Judiciary Committee. On
January 26, 1898, Chandler introduced a resolution on the Senate floor
directing the Attorney General of the United States "to inform the
Senate whether or not the records of the Department of Justice show
that in the State of Louisiana there have been recent violations of the
Constitution of the United States by the exclusion from service on juries
in the United States court of duly qualified citizens on account of color,"
and if there was such evidence, "what action has been taken or is in

132. OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra note 19, at 380.

133. Id.:
[W]e have not drafted the exact Constitution that we should like to have drafted;
otherwise we should have inscribed in it, if I know the popular sentiment of this State,
universal white manhood suffrage, and the exclusion from the suffrage of every man
with a trace of African blood in his veins. We could not do that, on account of the
fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and, therefore, we did
what has been [required by] the Supreme Court of the United States.
134. Don't Adopt the Fifth Section, supra note 26, at 4.
135. Id.
136. Cf. Amasa M. Eaton, The Suffrage Clause in the New Constitution of Louisiana, 13 HARV.
L. REV. 279, 293 (1899) (concluding suffrage provision "will be declared unconstitutional" and
recommending repeal of Fifteenth Amendment to facilitate disenfranchisement effort).
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contemplation by the Department." 13 7 The resolution passed by
unanimous consent. 138 These stands reinforced Chandler's status as a
hero of many black Louisianans, some of whom, barely literate, wrote
to share that they too had been kept off of Louisiana juries. 139
Such meddling earned Chandler the enmity, however, of
Louisiana's Democrats. Baton Rouge's leading newspaper disclaimed
the existence of racial discrimination in jury selection but emphasized
the abhorrence of black jury service:
[Tlhe Attorney General would be warmly applauded in this State should he politely refer
Mr. Chandler and his resolution to a clime hotter than this. If Mr. Chandler is really
anxious to have negroes serve on juries he ought to encourage the importation of negroes
to New Hampshire and then nobody here would object if he composed his juries entirely
of negroes all the time. It is unfortunately too true that too many negroes serve on juries
in this State and the interests of justice are not subserved thereby. . . . Negroes do serve
as jurors in this State, Mr. Chandler, all to [sic] often for the good of the State, but we
hope eventually to do better and to leave negro juries as an institution to be fostered in
New Hampshire .... 140

New Orleans's newspapers similarly denounced Chandler as "hater [ ]
of the Southern people," eager "to turn loose the Federal power on the
whites of this section."141 The "exclusion of negroes, as such" did not
exist in Louisiana. Instead, their names "are put in the wheels from
which the panels of jurors are drawn," and if rejected by the parties, "it
is for reasons peculiar to every such condition." 142
The convention's Judiciary Committee met in February and
March, at which time updates from Washington on the federal inquiry
regularly appeared in Louisiana papers. 143 Martinet and the Comitg
remained in correspondence with Chandler, who spoke out again in
April as the convention announced its suffrage plan.1 4 4 But Martinet's
correspondence took on a despondent, and even bitter, tone as the
convention progressed: "All the rights and privileges that make

137. 31 CONG. REC. 1019 (1898) ("Service on Juries in Louisiana").
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Letter from John Taylor, Sr. to the President of the United States and Congress
(May 1, 1898) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Chandler Papers,
1863-1917, Washington, D.C.); see also Letter from W. C. Hill to Hon. W. E. Chandler (Jan. 31,
1898) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Chandler Papers, 18631917, Washington, D.C.).
140. Begin in Time, DAILY ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 28, 1898, at 2, reprinted in The
Judiciary, LAFAYETTE GAZETTE (Lafayette, La.), Feb. 5, 1898, at 3.
141. Negroes on Juries, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 27, 1898, at 4.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Another Ambassador: Alleged Exclusion of Negroes from Jury Service, SEMIWKLY. TIMES-DEMOCRAT (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 8, 1898, at 7; News From Washington, DAILY
PICAYUNE, Mar. 8, 1898, at 1.
144. Attacking Our Suffrage Ordinance, SEMI-WKLY. TIMES-DEMOCRAT (New Orleans, La.),
Apr. 8, 1898, at 4.
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American citizenship desirable or worth anything"-including the right
to sit on juries-are "being taken one by one from the colored American
in the South." 145 The convention's work was "[a] monumental fraud,
abominable injustice, glaringly unconstitutional." 1 4 6 If the Attorney
General and the Senate Judiciary Committee took any further action
on the Comiti's protest, no evidence of it was left behind.
By early May, the convention had finalized its suffrage proposal
and its overhaul of the state's judiciary. In addition to directing the
legislature to develop a system for "select[ing] competent and
intelligent jurors," Article 116 of the new constitution eliminated jury
trials for misdemeanors, established a "jury of five" for low-level
felonies, and provided that "cases in which the punishment is
necessarily at hard labor" (i.e., more serious noncapital felonies) would
be tried "by a jury of twelve, nine of whom concurring may render a
verdict." 147 The Judiciary Committee's chairman Thomas Semmes
avoided any explicit reference to the issue of black jurors when
defending the new measures, but in a nod to the earliest calls for
nonunanimity, his explanation for the changes directly referenced the
practice of lynching: "We have so also so changed the judicial system
that the delays which have so often resulted in a man being hung by a
48
mob will disappear."1
The radical new provisions were too much even for some white
Democratic delegates, who warned against adopting a measure that
"abrogates the right of trial by jury-the very bulwark of our
liberties." 149 In the end, though, the measure passed by a vote of 72 to
27.150

Ascertaining conclusively the motives of historical actors,
particularly those who labored to insulate their conduct from federal

145. Letter from L.A. Martinet to the Hon. Attorney General (Feb. 8, 1898) (on file with
National Archives, Records of the U.S. Senate, Record Group 46, Committee Papers, Senate
Judiciary Committee, 55A-Fl5, Washington, D.C.).
146. Telegram from L.A. Martinet to the Hon. Wm. E. Chandler (Apr. 5, 1898) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Chandler Papers, 1863-1917, Washington,
D.C.).
147. LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 116. In cases involving the possibility of capital punishment,
however, the constitution still required that "all [twelve jurors] must concur to render a verdict."
Id. art. 1 § 17.
148. Thomas Semmes, Address, supra note 19, at 379.
149. Id. at 355.
150. Id. at 354.
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intervention, is tricky. 15 1 But even the limited record here permits
several observations from which logical inferences may be drawn. First,
those who adopted nonunanimous verdicts carefully and methodically
worked to dilute the political and civil rights of black Louisianans
within a legal framework that demanded at least lip service to the
fiction of race neutrality. These decisionmakers were overwhelmingly
concerned about the specter of federal nullification of their efforts.
Second, eliminating black jury service was a project of surpassing
importance for many white Southerners, but these efforts were creating
unwanted controversy in Louisiana at the time of the convention in
1898, drawing unwanted scrutiny from a prominent U.S. Senator and
the Attorney General. And third, although black jury service was
significantly curtailed by 1898, legal and political realities-including
continued agitation from the Comitg and other activists-did not yet
permit its complete eradication. (Indeed, black jurors continued to serve
sporadically throughout Louisiana and some other parts of the South
for at least another decade, much later than most scholars havek
recognized. 152) It should thus come as no surprise that, although there'
were similar calls to abandon unanimity in other Southern
jurisdictions, 153 it was only in Louisiana-the center of activism against'
the Jim Crow jury and home to a relatively sizeable black bourgeoisiethat such inventive reforms took purchase. Understood in this context,
151. Cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) ("Proving the motivation behind
official action is often a problematic undertaking. When we move ... to a body the size of the
Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901, the difficulties in determining the actual motivations
of the various legislators that produced a given decision increase.").
152. In 1901 in Opelousas, for example, "two of our bright and promising young lawyers
stopp[ed] short the wheels of justice," forcing a term of court to be cancelled, "because the names
of no negroes were placed in the venire box," a situation the local paper "regretted." Negro Jurors,
CLARION (Opelousas, La.), Dec. 28, 1901 (letter from jury commissioner explaining majority of
parish residents "do not want ... any more negroes on the jury"); Negro Jurors, CLARION
(Opelousas, La.), Nov. 2, 1901, at 2; see also Untitled, RICE BELT J. (Welsh, La.), May 5, 1905
("Stephen Lowe is on trial at Monroe. A negro man is one of the jurors.").
In 1909, a lawyer wrote to the clerks of court in over three hundred majority-black counties
throughout the South to inquire how often black jurors actually participated in trials. Four
Louisiana parishes responded: Parish No. 1 (3,900 white people, 12,700 black people)- "[W]e now
have no Negroes to serve on the jury here at all"; Parish No. 2 (8,800 white people, 11,300 black
people)- "[T]he number is very limited ... Out of the 300 names in the jury-box. . . there are
about a dozen Negroes"; Parish No. 3 (11,000 white people, 17,800 black people)-"[Iln this parish
Negroes have served on both our grand and petit juries ever since the Civil War . .. [T]hey usually
constitute about one-half of the panel on the petit jury and on the grand jury they are always
represented, but in a much smaller proportion."; Parish No. 4 (2,000 white people, 13,700 black
people)- "[W]e have had one Negro on the petit jury the last criminal term of court in a murder
case of another Negro. He is the only Negro that has sat on the jury for two or three years in our
parish." See Stephenson, supra note 66, at 888-90. While the reliability of such self-reported data
warrants skepticism, the evidence of at least minimal black jury participation post-1898 is
substantial.
153. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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the discriminatory motive for the adoption of nonunanimous verdicts in
1898 becomes clear: it ensured that black votes in the jury box (like
black votes at the ballot box) would be diluted to the point of
irrelevance. 154
II. THE JIM CROW JURY TODAY

The Jim Crow jury never fully fell. While the methods of racial
exclusion have changed over the years-peremptory challenges, for
example, "did not become a primary tool for excluding black jurors until
1935" 1 5 5-equitable representation on criminal juries has not existed
since the height of Reconstruction (and only then in limited areas). Put
differently, across American jury boxes today there are thousands of
missing nonwhite jurors. Instead, these seats are filled by white jurors
that, absent systemic racial exclusion, a nonwhite juror would be
occupying. In kind, if not degree, it has always been so since Congress
outlawed racial discrimination in jury selection 143 years ago.
The exclusion of black jurors matters for a host of reasons.
Depending on one's political orientation, meaningful diversity in
criminal juries can help ensure the "legitimacy" of criminal
convictions 15 6 or it can facilitate the "subversion of American criminal
justice, at least as it now exists" 15 7 through race-based jury
nullification. Representativeness is also critical insofar as jury service
"affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a
process of government,"158 educating jurors "from the various
represented groups about the nature and importance of civic
participation." 159 A full exploration of these various perspectives on the

154. This dilution approach prefigured the white response, many decades later, when black
jurors began serving on juries again in the post-World War II era. Well before petit juries were
reintegrated, many Southern jurisdictions tolerated black service on grand juries-larger bodies
without unanimity requirements where black jurors' votes "could be nullified through
supermajority voting rules or intimidation." See KLARMAN, supra note 29, at 268.
155. Colbert, supra note 37, at 12; see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (holding that
the systematic exclusion of African Americans from a jury by which an African American is
indicted or convicted solely based on race violates the Equal Protection Clause).
156. See Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition:
Battering and BolsteringLegitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1033 (2003).
157. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680 (1995) ("My
goal is the subversion of American criminal justice, at least as it now exists. Through jury
nullification, I want to dismantle the master's house with the master's tools.").
158. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
159. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 351, 361 (1999); see also Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as
Political ParticipationAkin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995) (linking discrimination
against particular age groups during jury selection with discrimination of voter participation in
the same age groups).
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jury is beyond the scope of this Article. But black jurors matter for a
more basic reason-one with direct ties to the rise of the Jim Crow jury
a century prior-that warrants further discussion: they tend to vote
differently than white jurors. This simple fact animated efforts to
exclude black jurors in the 1880s and 1890s and it continues to animate
efforts to exclude black jurors today.
In this Part, I present an overview of new data on the enduring
centrality of race in both criminal jury selection and criminal jury
deliberations. Over several years, investigative journalists in Louisiana
compiled a dataset ("the Russell-Simerman dataset") containing
information from over 5,000 criminal jury trials conducted in Louisiana
from 2011 to 2017.160 The quality and detail of the data vary from parish
to parish-a limitation attributable to the diversity of recordkeeping
practices of minute clerks, clerks of court, and district attorneys in
different jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the dataset contains vast amounts
of information about the race of jurors and the use of peremptory strikes
in Louisiana. 161 For instance, it includes demographic information on
over 40,000 potential and empaneled jurors (10,995 of whom were
empaneled, 7,665 of whom were peremptorily struck by defendants, and
5,664 of whom were peremptorily struck by prosecutors 162). This sample
size is significantly larger than any previous study on the use of
peremptory strikes. 16 3 It also identifies over 700 nonunanimous verdicts
in Louisiana over the time period, and in 199 of these, the race of the
juror casting each vote is ascertainable by cross-referencing preserved
polling slips with other public information. 164 The data thus offer a
novel way to assess how real-world jurors of different races, viewing the
exact same evidence, evaluate guilt and innocence.
The findings are disquieting, if unsurprising. Prosecutors wield
both peremptory strikes and for-cause challenges 165 to eliminate black

160. For the collection methodology and raw data for the Russell-Simerman dataset, see Jeff
Adelson, Download Data Used in The Advocate's Exhaustive Research in 'Tilting the Scales' Series,
ADVOCATE (New Orleans, La.) (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.theadvocate.com/new-orleans/news/
courts/article_6f3ld456-351a-11e8-9829-130ab26e88e9.html [https://perma.cc/UEX3-B652].
161. Id.
162. The balance of the individuals in the dataset were "surplus" potential jurors who,
although summoned to the courthouse, did not end up serving or being struck.
163. See infra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
164. In 1974, the provision of the Louisiana Constitution allowing a verdict upon the
concurrence of nine jurors was modified to require the concurrence of ten jurors. Current law is
otherwise identical to the rule adopted in 1898: it allows for nonunanimous verdicts in all serious
noncapital felony cases (i.e., "[a] case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard
labor"). See LA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
165. Counsel generally may challenge any potential juror "for cause" if that individual has
indicated they may be biased or otherwise disqualified from serving. Peremptory strikes, which
are authorized in federal trials and in all fifty states, allow counsel to remove a fixed number of
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potential jurors at an extraordinarily disproportionate rate, and they
do so with greater frequency when prosecuting black defendants. A
black potential juror is overwhelmingly more likely to be struck by a
prosecutor than by defense counsel, particularly when a black
defendant is on trial. 166 And, it turns out, this race-based selection
strategy, however odious, is far from irrational; black jurors are
significantly overrepresented among those jurors casting ballots for
"not guilty" verdicts while white jurors are significantly
underrepresented. Criminal law scholar Kim Taylor-Thompson has
argued that the Supreme Court's acceptance of nonunanimous verdicts
in criminal trials "showed little appreciation of a possible relationship
between this practice and the Court's long history of battling exclusions
of groups from the jury process."1 67 Drawing mainly on social cognition
theory and mock-trial studies,1 68 Professor Taylor-Thompson
presciently warned that "nonunanimous decisionmaking in criminal
trials could jeopardize the limited victories that historically excluded
69
groups have won in cases challenging barriers to jury service."1 The
data confirm this "empty-vote" hypothesis. Because the overwhelming
majority of nonunanimous verdicts are nonunanimous convictions as
opposed to acquittals, the discrepancies mean that the nonunanimousverdict rule continues to operate today as it was designed to operate
during the Plessy era-black jurors are more likely than white jurors to
cast "empty votes" (i.e., dissenting votes that are overridden by
supermajority verdicts). Nonunanimity also appears to accrue to the
disadvantage of black defendants more frequently than white
defendants; defendants in the former group are more likely than the
latter to be convicted by nonunanimous votes, which in other
jurisdictions would result in a mistrial (or, at minimum, prolonged
deliberations).
The discussion below is intended only to introduce the RussellSimerman dataset; other scholars will undoubtedly dive deeper into

"otherwise qualified" potential jurors for any reason, provided the rationale is not "discriminatory"
within the meaning of Batson and its progeny. See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race
Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway? 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 726 n.3
(1992).
166. But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 137-38 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
In my view, there is simply nothing "unequal" about the State's using its peremptory
challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as
such challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases involving white defendants,
Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defendants, Asians in cases involving Asian
defendants, and so on.
167. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 22, at 1265.
168. Id. at 1290-95.
169. Id. at 1264.
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this invaluable resource. 170 (Further data from Louisiana, however, will
probably not be forthcoming. In May 2018, in response to the initial
release of the data upon which this article is based, Louisiana
lawmakers unanimously enacted a new law to facilitate the sealing of
juror records. 171) But even a cursory review of the numbers provides a
striking reminder that the Jim Crow jury endures. Despite the lofty
pronouncements of the Supreme Court that race-based exclusion from
jury service is "at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society
and a representative government," 1 7 2 the practice has been central to
criminal adjudication throughout American history. It remains so now.
A. Race-Based Challenges
Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court held in Batson v.
Kentucky that prosecutors' privilege to wield peremptory challenges
was subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause. 173 The.
Court established a now-familiar framework for evaluating such claims:
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has
been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution
must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the
parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown
purposeful discrimination. 174

Since Batson, however, the Courts' failure to meaningfully enforce the
prohibition on racial discrimination in jury selection has come under
withering criticism, with many scholars concluding the Court has been
"anxious to render its own decision as meaningless, ineffective, and
unthreatening as possible." 175 The Court's most recent opinion on racial

170. For example, this Article does not address sex discrimination in jury selection, though it
is an area of extensive research and scholarship. The Russell-Simerman dataset also includes
information on jurors' sex, defendants' charges, for-cause challenges, trial outcomes, sentencing,
length of deliberations, and other related information. See Adleson, supra note 160.
171. See 2018 La. Acts 335. Proponents of the measure said that the new law was needed to
ensure juror privacy; critics complained that it was designed to make Louisiana's jury system even
more opaque and to thwart further efforts to study racial disparities. See Gordon Russell, Bill To
Keep Split Jury Votes Secret Becomes Law Despite Push for Jury Unanimity in Louisiana,
ADVOCATE (New Orleans, La.) (May 20, 2018, 5:01 PM) https://www.theadvocate.com/batonrougel
news/politics/legislature/article f0fd4186-5a23-1 1e8-a202-2b7a4b652452.html
[https://perma.cc/R6AG-Y4KW].
172. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204 (1965) (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130
(1940)).
173. 476 U.S. 79, 86, 89 (1986).
174. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 475 (2008).
175. Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failureto Meet the
Challenge of Discriminationin Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 501, 501 (1999). But see Jonathan
Abel, Batson's Appellate Appeal and Trial Tribulations, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 713 (2018)
(emphasizing Batson doctrine's relative virtues in appellate and postconviction litigation).
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176
discrimination in jury selection in 2016, Foster v. Chatman, was a
fact-bound decision that did little to mollify critics.17 7
But to what extent is racial exclusion still a core feature of jury
selection in the post-Batson world? Seven empirical studies have
appeared in scholarly journals seeking to assess Batson's efficacy, all
17 8 These
but one examining peremptory strikes only in capital trials.
17 9 to several hundred
studies range in size from thirteen jury panels
jury panels,1 80 and they vary significantly in terms of design and
statistical rigor. All concur in the basic finding, however, that
176. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
177. See Nancy S. Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson and the
Peremptory Challenge, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1137 (2017); see also infra notes 242-243 and
accompanying text.
178. David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A
Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001). The other six are Ann M. Eisenberg
et al., IfIt Walks Like Systematic Exclusion and Quacks Like Systematic Exclusion: Follow-up on
Removal of Women and African-Americans in Jury Selection in South CarolinaCapital Cases,
1997-2014, 68 S.C. L. REV. 373 (2017); Ann Eisenberg, Removal of Women and AfricanAmericans in Jury Selection in South CarolinaCapital Cases, 1997-2012, 9 NE. U. L.J. 299
(2017); Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O'Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming
Importance ofRace in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North CarolinaCapital Trials, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 1531 (2012); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender
Discrimination?Some Data from One County, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 697 (1999); Billy M.
Turner et al., Race and Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire: Do Prosecutionand Defense
Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61 (1986); and Bruce J. Winnick, ProsecutorialPeremptory Challenge
Practices in Capital Cases:An EmpiricalStudy and a ConstitutionalAnalysis, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1 (1982). Researchers for nonprofit organizations have published an additional three reports
containing empirical findings on race and jury selection. RICHARD BOURKE ET AL., BLACK
STRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE
JEFFERSON PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (2003) (on file with author); URSULA NOYE,
BLACKSTRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE
CADDO PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (Aug. 2015), https://blackstrikes.com/resources/

BlackstrikesCaddoParishAugust_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE7P-HUXJ]; EQUAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY (Aug.

&

2010), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MRZ-XPFJI. Other noteworthy empirical studies on jury selection that do not
address race include Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Clear Choices and Guesswork in
Peremptory Challenges in Federal Criminal Trials, 160 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y, SERIES A 275
(1997); and Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challengeson Jury
and Verdict: An Experiment in a FederalDistrict Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978).
A series of important studies on race, jury selection, and trial outcomes is forthcoming from a
group of scholars at Wake Forest University who have launched the Jury Sunshine Project. These
researchers have built a large database collecting detailed information from the "strong majority"
of all felony trials conducted in North Carolina in a single year. See Ronald F. Wright, Kami Chavis
& Gregory S. Parks, The Jury Sunshine Project:Jury Selection Data as a PoliticalIssue, 2018 U.
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2994288
[https://perma.cc/7FZB-LZHQ] (introducing research and providing some preliminary findings);
see also Francis X. Flanagan, Race, Gender, and Juries:Evidence from North Carolina, 61 J.L.
72
.pdf
ECON. (forthcoming 2018), http://ipl.econ.duke.edulseminars/system/files/seminars/18
[https://perma.cc/8BRY-RP7C].
179. Rose, supra note 178.
180. Baldus et al., supra note 178, is comfortably the largest, examining jury selection in 317
capital murder cases in Philadelphia between 1981 and 1997.
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The Russell-Simnerman dataset provides the latest and most
robust support for this observation to date, demonstrating that racial
exclusion remains central to the selection of crininal juries. The dataset
identifies the race of over 40,000 potential jurors summoned in nearly
1,.000) Louisiana jury trials; this includes information concerning 16,323
white potential jurors and 6,106 black potential jurors who were
dismiss~ed by a prosecution peremptory strike, dismissed by a defense
peremptory strike, or empaneled (Table 1 .1). The overall racial
breakdown of this group of jurors is provided in Table 1.2.
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their peremptory strikes in a "racially balanced" way -that is, if the
4 peremptory strikes and race were entirely auc orrelated we
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to cloak even the most overt forms of racism through pretextual raceneutral justifications, although it does. 18 3 Rather, the problem is that it
also places the Court's imprimatur on the sincerely "colorblind" 184
elimination of jurors whose views (e.g., mistrust of law enforcement and
prosecutors),18 5 personal experiences (e.g., having an incarcerated
friend or family member), 18 6 or moral convictions (e.g., reluctance to
impose capital punishment)18 7 are highly correlated with and deeply
embedded in the lived -experience of race in America.18 8 Yet if
prosecutors are assiduously honoring, rather than attempting to
subvert, the imperative of "colorblindness"-while nevertheless
eliminating black jurors at 175% of the expected rate-existing
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence may be even more infirm than
cynics allege. 189
But a closer look at the data provides reasons to suspect that the
more overt variety of racially motivated exclusions-the narrow type of
racially discriminatory action Batson aimed to ferret out-also remain
common. One way to measure this is to control for the race of the.
defendant. If a prosecutor's racially disproportionate use of peremptorystrikes is genuinely tied to some "race-neutral" attribute of black
potential jurors, the frequency with which strikes are used to eliminate
minority jurors should remain roughly constant in prosecutions against
black and white defendants. "Race-neutral" attributes correlated with

183. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:,
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POLY REV. 149, 162-63 (2010) (providing examples of such implicit bias).
184. See generally Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities"' Race, Ethnicity, and
Reactionary Colorblindness,59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2006) (discussing the emergence of "reactionary
colorblindness" in the U.S. legal system).
185. See William J. Powers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An EmpiricalAnalysis
of the Role of Jurors'Raceand Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 180 nn.41-43
(2001).
186. See Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records
Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 387, 414 (2017).
187. See Baldus et al., supranote 178, at 19 n.40 ("Disparities in opinion polls are most marked
along racial lines. When asked in a 1997 poll if they believe in or are opposed to the capital
punishment, 80% of whites said they believe in it, compared to 46% of blacks.").
188. For a compelling argument that existing doctrine invites, if not requires, "proactive,
creative, and assertive" scrutiny of race-neutral justifications that disparately impact particular
groups, see Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of
Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1359 (2012). Professor Anna Roberts finds that courts tend to
engage in this sort of rigorous review, however, exclusively in cases involving the exclusion of white
jurors.
189. But see KENNEDY, supra note 49, at 236 (acknowledging that "[riacial disparities
stemming from the operation of nonracial criteria do often reflect the vestiges of past racial
discrimination" but arguing against those who "[i]n their rebellion against illicit selection
schemes . . . have gone to the untenable extreme of denouncing virtually all criteria in favor,
apparently, of unbounded representation on juries").
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e potential juror's race should be the same no matter t he defendant's
ce. I, on the other hand, it is race qua race thai drive sthe disparity,
e would expect to see greater efforts by prosecutors to e liminate black
vC
tential jurors when black dlefendants are tried.
It turns out the latter hypothesis is correc t: p)rosecutors
sproportionately strike black jurors no matter xwho they are
'osecuting, but the disparity between the racially bal~a nced expected
re sult and the observed result is significantly greater when a black
deC fendant stands accused. In cases involving white def endants (Table
2. 2), the initial racial breakdown of the venire skewed more heavily
hite, with 74% white potential jurors and 20% black p otential jurors.
this composition, prosecutors used 29% of their strikes (ir
black notential inrors and (14% of heir strikes n /22) ag~
wnite potential juro 's. That means that prosecut rs ste ick black ji
with 144% of the f requency we would expect ii ~ actin it in a rm
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BLE 2.2: I~RO8ECtJT1ON PEJIEMPi'OttY STilL
WHITE I)m'itND XN'rs ONLY

C ompoMIiofl of

Du-~panty I(aIw

74,4 ~

20. l0 u

1.443

4.

1.4LY

With black defendants, however, prosecutors demonstrated
greater eagerness to retnove potential black jurors fromn the venire
(Table 2,3). In cases involving black defendants, beginning with an
initial pool of 616% white and 28% black jurors, prosecutors usedl 42%~ ot
their strikes (n=1,872) against white potential jurors, and 51% of their
strikes (n=2,2538) against black potential jurors. The frequency of
strikes against black potential jurors was 181% of what we would expect
if strikes were doled out in a racially balanced manner. The disparities
documented in Tables 2.1 2.3 are visually represented in Figure 1
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As F'igure 1 illustrates, prosecut io n strikes against whnite pe: (I'ei*~ ti al jurors
(represented by the first three columns) occ ur less fre qiten tly thar
expected based on white jurors' representation in the v~enir! 'Ph h is trot
in all cases, but it is particularly true itn cases involving blac
eadants
The negative values here corespontd with a "disparity ra. in" levi than
1LO-tbe expected disparity ratio if tbe proportion of preen ptocv ~4rikes
aligned with the ratcial comnposiion of the venire-in TPables 2.1 23. The
larger absolute values reflect a greater disparity betweent he "expected"
and "observed" results, For example, the "disparity ratio' of O85'1 for
white potential jurors in tcases involving white tdefendtanits (St'e supro
bt
2.2) is represented here with the value -14.6% in the fa r4eti enl fin
Prosecution strikes against blatck poteti al jurors (represenit ;otl hy Ii
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three columns), on the other hand, occur much more frequently than
expected based on black jurors' representation in the venire. The disparity
is, again, greatest in cases involving black defendants. The positive values
here correspond with a "disparity ratio" greater than 1.0 in Tables 2.12.3. Thus, the "disparity ratio" of 1.806 for black potential jurors in cases
involving black defendants (see supra Table 2.3) is represented here with
the value +80.6% in the far-right column.

The disparities are even greater in prosecutors' use of "for-cause"
challenges, a topic most of the existing literature on racial bias in jury
selection overlooks. Excluding from the sample those for-cause
challenges where the prosecution and defense agree on the juror's
dismissal-that is, looking only at contested for-cause challengesprosecutors overwhelmingly use for-cause challenges to eliminate black
potential jurors. Of the 975 potential jurors that prosecutors
successfully challenged for cause, over 58.5% (n=570) were black jurors
while only 34.2% (n=333) were white jurors. This disparity is
significantly larger than the (already sizable) racial disparity observed
in prosecutors' use of their peremptory strikes (see supra Table 2.1).
Conversely, defendants disproportionately struck white potential jurors
with for-cause challenges, but these figures hewed more closely to
overall representation of the respective groups in the initial pool: of
defendants' 727 successful for-cause challenges, 74.2% (n=540) targeted
white potential jurors while 21.0% (n=153) targeted black potential
jurors.
There are several different ways to think about the impact of
such numbers. One is to consider it from the perspective of a potential
juror who has just been dismissed with a peremptory strike (Figure 2).
If that individual is black, the odds that the State of Louisiana, as
opposed to the defendant, was responsible for striking the juror are 3:1.
(If we limit our sample to only those cases where a black defendant is
on trial, the odds jump to 3.6:1; when a white defendant is on trial, the
odds are "only" 1.5:1.) These ratios are particularly dramatic since, in
absolute terms, the dataset includes about 35% more peremptory
strikes made by defendants than by prosecutors. 19 0

190. One possible explanation for this disparity is that defendants have a unique incentive to
exhaust all of their peremptory strikes; failure to do so forfeits any appellate claim that the trial
court erroneously denied a for-cause challenge. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 674 So. 2d 250, 254 (La.
1996) ("[W]e need not reach the issue of whether there was an erroneous denial of defendant's
challenge for cause, since the record reveals that defendant failed to use all his peremptory
challenges.").
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30% of the white potential jurors and 42% of the black potential jurors
from the "otherwise qualified" pool. When the defendant Is black (Table
3.2), however, the prosecution's peremptory strikes eliminate just 25%
of the white potential jurors and 18% of the black potential jurors.
These results are represented in Figure 3.
ABLE 8,1: PROSLCU'J'ORs' ELLMiNA JON OF "O'rIlMtv iME (pJAl.
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FIGURE 3: PROSECUTION ELIMINATION RATE OF
"OTHERWISE QUALIFIED" JURORS
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There is another important insight from the Russell-Simerman
dataset that adds to the debate over one common proposal for reform:
the complete elimination of peremptory strikes. 192 While the statistics
demonstrate substantial racial disparities in how prosecutors wield
their peremptory strikes, peremptory strikes (in toto) are not
necessarily the primary drivers of black underrepresentation on juries,
at least in those jurisdictions with sizeable nonwhite populations in the
first instance. 193 The simple explanation is that defendants' peremptory
192. See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (1997); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal
to Eliminate Racially DiscriminatoryUse of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099
(1993).
193. Some caution about this observation is warranted. One-third of the detailed juror data in
the Russell-Simerman dataset comes from three parishes (East Baton Rouge, Caddo, and Orleans)
where black residents comprise an unusually large percentage of the population (between 45% and
60%), registered voters (between 44% and 57%), and initial venires (between 33% and 51%). In
such jurisdictions, it is harder for prosecutors to make a sizeable dent in the overall percentage of
black jurors in the venire through peremptory strikes, particularly when counteracted by similarly
racially skewed strikes by defendants. In jurisdictions with fewer black residents, the same
number of peremptory strikes can eliminate a larger share of the potential black jurors (while
similarly disproportionate strikes targeting white jurors will have a negligible effect on that much
larger group's overall representation). Two of the parishes where peremptory strikes had the
largest proportional effect in reducing the representation of black jurors were parishes with a
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strikes by prosecutors targeting underrepresented minority jurors. 19 4
The overall equilibrium is not evidence that the system is working;
rather, it reflects systemic, mirror-image violations of both black and
white jurors' constitutional rights.
But those with fewer qualms about the systematic exclusion of
white jurors by nonwhite defendants should be concerned by the overall
data presented, too. Notwithstanding the "offset effect" identified
above, the Russell-Simerman dataset illuminates the enduring
relevance of race in jury selection today, and it shows how prosecutors'
use of both for-cause and peremptory strikes drastically curtails the
participation of underrepresented minority jurors in criminal
adjudication. A jury selection system that actually barred such racially
disproportionate strikes would visibly and dramatically remake the
color of America's juries. More than a century after the initial fights
over the Jim Crow jury, black jurors remain systematically excluded
from American jury boxes.
B. Measuringthe Impact of Race on Jury Deliberationsand the
DisparateImpact of Nonunanimity
The Jim Crow jury also endures when our focus shifts to jury
deliberations. Undergirding the movement to impose (and resist) the
Jim Crow jury in the nineteenth century was the basic assumption that
black jurors might return different verdicts than white jurors if allowed
into the jury box. This basic intuition has become controversial,
however, particularly in light of the Court's overarching commitment to'
"colorblindness"-that is, its insistence that race has no rational
relationship with one's work as a juror-in its Batson jurisprudence. 195
Does jurors' race actually matter inside the jury box? By examining the
racial composition of nonunanimous verdicts, this Article demonstrates
in a novel way how race continues to shape the way jurors assess guilt
and innocence.
The extent to which jurors' race and racial prejudices influence
jury deliberations has been the subject of scholarship and debate for

194. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that "the Constitution prohibits
a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the
exercise of peremptory challenges"); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986) ("The
potential for racial prejudice, further, inheres in the defendant's challenge as well."); Audrey M.
Fried, Fulfilling the Promiseof Batson: ProtectingJurorsfrom the Use of Race-Based Peremptory
Challenges by Defense Counsel, 64 U CHI. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
195. See infra Part III; see also Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox:Harmless Error,
Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 122-23 (1996).
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decades. 1 9 6 Research on race and jury deliberations generally falls into
one of three categories: (1) archival analysis of verdicts in actual cases,
(2) post-trial interviews with jurors, or (3) mock trial studies in
controlled settings. 1 9 7 Archival analysis generally represents the "ideal
way to study the relationship between race and jury verdicts," but "[t]he
difficulty inherent in this type of investigation is that criminal trials
vary along a wide range of dimensions." 19 8 Even the best designed
archival analyses "face the interpretive difficulties of controlling for
confounding variables and the limitations posed by a correlational
research design." 199 For that reason, there is a dearth of field research
on the role of juror race in real-world jury deliberations (particularly
outside the capital context). 200
But the Russell-Simerman dataset provides a unique way to
control for many of these variables: it tells us how black and white
jurors-evaluating the exact same evidence in real-life settings-view
guilt and innocence. For a limited but still sizeable number of jury
verdicts, the race of the jurors and the votes cast by those jurors are
now known.
These cases demonstrate that the nonunanimous-decision rule
operates today just as it was intended to 120 years ago-to dilute the
influence of black jurors. The dataset contains detailed information on
jurors' race and jurors' votes for 199 nonunanimous verdicts delivered
by racially mixed juries. 201 The nonunanimous verdict was "guilty" in
190 of these verdicts and "not guilty" in 9. Let's consider first the
"guilty" verdicts. In these cases, decided by 11-1 or 10-2 votes, white
jurors cast 64.1% of the total votes (n=1,461) and black jurors cast

196. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611 (1985); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination:Measuring the Effects
of JurorRace on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 67-105 (1993); Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Reviewing
the Empirical Evidence on Jury Racism: Findings of Discriminationor DiscriminatoryFindings?
69 NEB. L. REV. 230, 233 (1990) (arguing "[t]he available data regarding the role of racism in jury
decisionmaking does not support the contention that juror objectivity is adversely affected by the
inability to set aside personal prejudices"); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much
Do We Really Know about Race and Juries?A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (2003); Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171 (2007).

197. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 196, at 997.
198. Id. at 998.
199. Id. at 1000.
200. See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 116-18

(2012).
201. The dataset also includes 8 nonunanimous verdicts returned by all-white juries, but these
are omitted for present purposes since they provide no information on the basic question of
whether white and black jurors evaluate the same evidence differently.
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FIGURE 5 - "EMPTY VOTES" IN NONUNANIMOUS CONVICTIONS
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Nonunanimous Verdicts

Racial Composition of "Empty Votes" in
Nonunanimous Verdicts

The overrepresentation of nonwhite jurors among the group
casting "empty votes" for acquittal appears both in parishes where
black jurors are relatively scarce and in parishes where black jurors
serve in significant numbers. In the 28 nonunanimous convictions in
Orleans Parish for which data is available, for example, white jurors
(n=155) and black jurors (n=168) served in roughly equal numbers. Yet
black jurors cast more than twice the number of "empty votes" for
acquittal (n=25) than did white jurors (n=12). Nonunanimity serves to
mute the impact of nonwhite jurors even when such jurors are not, in
2 04
numerical terms, "minorities."
The data also suggest that in addition to disproportionately
silencing the voices of black jurors, nonunanimous verdicts
204. The 9 nonunanimous acquittals did not yield such radical disparities. In these cases,
white jurors cast 65% of total votes (n=70) and black jurors cast 33% of total votes (n=36). Black
and white jurors cast "not guilty" votes in roughly proportional numbers (white jurors cast 63%
(n=60) and black jurors cast 35% (n=34) of the "not guilty" ballots). White jurors were
overrepresented among the holdout votes for "guilty," casting ten of the twelve votes, but such a
small sample precludes the drawing of meaningful conclusions.
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disproportionately disadvantage black defendants: black defendants
were more likely to be convicted in cases where at least one or two jurors
harbored doubts. 205 While the Russell-Simerman dataset contains the
racial breakdown of votes for 199 nonunanimous verdicts, it also
includes more rudimentary information on a vastly larger number
(n=1,807) of unanimous (n=1,071) and nonunanimous (n=736) "guilty"
verdicts returned by twelve-person juries. But these convictions were
not split proportionately between black and white defendants. Rather,
black defendants made up 75% (n=1,355) of all convictions, but 79%
(n=579) of the total nonunanimous convictions and 72% (n=776) of the
total unanimous convictions. White defendants' convictions, both
unanimous and nonunanimous (n=413), skewed in the opposite
directions. Thus, while white defendants accounted for 23% of the total
convictions where one or more jurors harbored doubts regarding the
defendant's guilt, they were overrepresented (26%, n=275) among
unanimous convictions and underrepresented (19%, n=138) among.
nonunanimous convictions.
The full impact of these numbers is best appreciated from the
perspective of the convicted defendant. When a conviction is obtained
against a black defendant, there is a 43% chance that the verdict was
nonunanimous (or, conversely, a 57% chance the verdict was
unanimous). When the convicted defendant is white, there is only a 33%
chance the verdict was nonunanimous (and thus a 67% chance the
verdict was unanimous). 206 Figure 6 illustrates how black defendants
are disproportionately likely to find themselves convicted by operation
of the nonunanimous-verdict rule as compared to their white
counterparts.

205. That one or two jurors voted "not guilty" at the moment a supermajority achieved ten or
eleven votes does not mean that the trial necessarily would have resulted in a mistrial or acquittal,
of course, had unanimity been required. Many of these juries would have eventually reached
unanimity with further deliberations, and most of these would have ended with convictions. But
it seems safe to assume that at least some of them would have resulted in mistrials or convictions
for lesser offenses.
206. This difference in the rate of nonunanimous convictions between black and white
defendants is significant at the .001 level.
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FIGURE 6 - CONVICTION TYPE BY DEFENDANT'S RACE
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Convictions of
Black Defendants
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Do nonunanimous verdicts then make it more likely that
innocent defendants-and particularly innocent black defendants-will
be wrongfully convicted? 2 07 The dataset provides no clear answer,
although it does reveal that (at least for prison sentences of more than
a few years) there are thousands of people serving hard labor sentences
who were convicted when one or two jurors still had reasonable doubts.
And perhaps the voices of those dissenters should be credited more
often. Since 1990, there have been twenty-five individuals exonerated
in Louisiana after convictions for felony offenses subject to the
nonunanimous-verdict rule-that is, for serious noncapital felonies. Of
those twenty-five, eleven were sent to prison by nonunanimous

juries. 208
III. THE FUTURE OF THE JIM CROW JURY

The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal protection of
the laws," the Supreme Court explained in Batson, guarantees a
defendant the right "to be tried by a jury whose members are selected
209
Time and again, the Court
pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria."
in the jury system
prejudice
racial
"permitting
that
affirmed
has
207. For a debate in the political science literature on this issue, compare Timothy Feddersen
& Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts
Under Strategic Voting, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23 (1998), with Peter J. Coughlan, In Defense of
Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting, 94 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
375 (2000).
208. Emily Maw & Jee Park, Opinion, Do Non-unanimous Verdicts Discriminate?, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 5, 2017, https://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2017/10/
(urging better data collection by court
jury-verdicts.html [https://perma.cc/U9X5-6SFD]
authorities to assess whether this figure was disproportionately high).
209. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986).
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damages 'both the fact and the perception' of the jury's role as 'a vital
check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State.' "210 But the
data presented here show that, far from being "at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government," 2 1 1
racial prejudice has always infected America's criminal jury system.
In this Part, I want to situate our current legal framework's
permissive approach toward racial bias in the jury system within the
much broader arc of U.S. jury-discrimination law. Despite recent
pronouncements to the contrary, our "maturing legal system" simply is
not "understand[ing] and . .. implement[ing] the lessons of history."212
To the contrary, the Court's two most recent encounters with racial
prejudice and the jury (Foster v. Chatman213 and Pefia-Rodriguez v.
Colorado2 14) fit comfortably within the Court's long tradition of halting
gestures toward countering racial bias, despite delivering legal victories
to the individual nonwhite defendants seeking relief. But if the past
century's efforts have failed to abolish the Jim Crow jury, where do we%
go next? In one sense, the project seems daunting: so long as racism,
permeates American life, the long view teaches, it will be impossible to
extirpate it from our flawed and imperfect jury system. And yet, the
history and data presented in Parts I and II suggest the necessity of
reforms-including an abolition of nonunanimous verdicts and perhaps
the adoption of affirmative race-conscious measures to ensure the racial
representativeness of juries-that could erode the Jim Crow jury's
enduring hold on the operation of American criminal justice.

While legal frameworks have changed radically since the 1890s,
what is most striking about the editorials in the Daily Crusaderis not
how distant the past appears, but rather how incisively nineteenthcentury activists identified doctrinal shortcomings that still plague our
jury-discrimination law. Consider, for example, two of the most
frequently advanced critiques of Batson and its progeny. First, under
existing law, a prosecutor's race-neutral justification for striking a juror
may be "silly or superstitious"; the Court does not even require "a

210.
400, 411
211.
(1940)).
212.
213.
214.

Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
(1991)).
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204 (1965) (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130
Peia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871.
136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
Perla-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855.
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215
reason that makes sense," provided the reason is race-neutral.
Predictably, only the "unapologetically bigoted or painfully
unimaginative" seem to be ensnared in Batson's net. 2 16 Second, by
shunning a "statistically based approach to exclusionary peremptory
challenges" in favor of "scrutiny of individual actions," the Court has
rendered itself ill equipped "to confront the pervasive effects of racism
in any meaningful way." 2 1 7 Racial justice activists waging the initial
fight against "the Jim Crow jury" advanced both of these same critiques
120 years ago. Then, as now, legal claims alleging jury discrimination
occasionally prevailed, but only when "unapologetically bigoted or
2 18
painfully unimaginative" officials effectively conceded the issue.
Then, as now, courts demonstrated indifference to widespread patterns
of racial exclusion, crediting instead the perfunctory race-neutral
justifications offered by state jury commissioners and judges. On this

215. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995); accord Pruitt v. McAdory, 337 F.3d 921, 928
(7th Cir. 2003) (explaining "[a]ny neutral reason, no matter how implausible or fantastic, even if
it is sill or superstitious, is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination").
216. Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More than the
UnapologeticallyBigoted or Painfully UnimaginativeAttorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 110205 (2011).
217. Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1811-12 (1992) (analogizing to McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)). For an early and influential argument on the utility of statistical tools,
see Michael 0. Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
DiscriminationCases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1966).
218. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 216, at 1102-05; see supra note 66 and accompanying text;
see also State v. Wilkins, 94 So. 3d 983, 991-92 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2012) (overturning murder
conviction where prosecutor's "race-neutral" explanation for peremptory strikes of black jurors in
racially charged case, accepted by the trial court, was "I have one [reason] that I am uncomfortable
putting on the record, but I will put it on the record. . . . [T]he fact that the juror is an AfricanAmerican, I didn't want to run the risk of putting her on the jury-and it applies to the rest of
them also. . . . I am just not comfortable putting a bunch of African-Americans on the jury. . . . I

think blacks would be a little bit more inflamed by that word ['nigger'] than others."). Over the
past decade, Louisiana courts vacated just six other convictions on Batson grounds. (A federal
district court also granted habeas relief in one case.) Only four of the Louisiana cases involved the
improper denial of a defendant's Batson challenge; the other two held that the trial court
erroneously granted prosecutors' "reverse-Batson"challenges, denying defense counsel the use of
their peremptory strikes against white jurors. See Trotter v. Warden, 718 F. Supp. 2d 746 (W.D.
La. 2010) (granting habeas relief); State v. Harris, 217 So. 3d 255 (La. 2016); State v. Broussard,
201 So. 3d 400 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2016); State v. Maxwell, 17 So. 3d 505 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2009); State v. Cheatteam, 986 So. 2d 738 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2008); State v. Nelson, 85 So. 3d
21 (La. 2012) (reverse-Batson challenge); State v. Pierce, 131 So. 3d 146 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2013) (reverse-Batson challenge). For a recent case illustrating the courts' overwhelming tendency
to deny relief, see State v. Williams, 199 So. 3d 1222, 1237 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2016) (holding no
prima facie case of discriminatory intent had been established where the prosecutor used all eleven
peremptory strikes on black jurors).
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view, Batson is not "failing"; it is succeeding at doing what U.S. law has
consistently done for the past century.219
Indeed, in certain ways, we are less clear-eyed in countering
racial bias in the jury system today than we were at the dawn of the
Jim Crow jury. Although it is almost entirely forgotten nowoverlooked even by scholars of jury discrimination 220-it remains a
federal misdemeanor (punishable by a $5,000 fine) for "an officer or
other person charged with any duty in the selection . .. of jurors [to]
exclude[ ]" a potential juror "on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." 221 The offense first became law with the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.222 Four years later, at least nine Virginia judges
were indicted under the statute for excluding black jurors from their
courtrooms. 2 2 3 On the same day that the Court decided Strauder
(invalidating West Virginia's jury-discrimination law under the
Fourteenth Amendment), it rejected a habeas petition filed by one of
these Virginia judges in Ex Parte Virginia.224 But since then there have
been no reported criminal prosecutions under Section 4 of the Act. As
the data reported in Part II illustrates, however, there is almost
certainly a crime wave occurring throughout America's courtrooms
today (though federal authorities are loathe to treat it as such). 225
219. Cf. Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal
Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419 (2016) (discussing the problems associated with U.S. law and
the U.S. criminal justice system).
220. Even scholars who have explored alternative remedies for Batson violations and harsher
sanctions (e.g., contempt) to discourage such discrimination seem unaware of Section 243's'
existence. E.g., Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and DiscriminationAfter Batson, 50 STAN:
L. REV. 9 (1997); Jason Mazzone, Batson Remedies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1613 (2012); Ogletree, supra
note 192, at 1119-34;. Justice Kennedy's overview in Peiia-Rodriguezof historical efforts to counter
"state-sponsored racial discrimination in jury selection" also tellingly omits the Civil Rights Act of
1875.
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) For one of the very few articles to
recognize the potential utility (or even existence) of Section 243, see Jonathan F. Mitchell,
Textualism and the FourteenthAmendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1237, 1291-94 (2017) (arguing "[t]he
Court's use of the Equal Protection Clause at the expense of 18 U.S.C. § 243 has led to many
problems in the Court's juror-exclusion doctrine").
221. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2012).
222. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 28 Stat. 335, 335-37.
223. See Five Judges Indicted in Judge Rives's Court, STAUNTON SPECTATOR (Staunton, Va.),
March 4, 1879, at 3. Subsequent news reports list additional indictments; see, e.g., Indicted Judges,
CHI. TRIB., March 18, 1879, at 9; More Judges Indicted, N.Y. DAILY HERALD (New York City, N.Y.),
March 21, 1879, at 3.
224. 100 U.S. 303, 347 (1880).
225. Indeed, attorneys are almost never subject even to professional disciplinary sanctions
for Batson violations today, let alone criminal charges. Despite the apparent prevalence of the
practice, see supra Part II, the racially motivated use of peremptory strikes has resulted in only
one Louisiana attorney being disciplined in recent decades; it was a black attorney who, in
addition to a host of other professional misconduct, admitted to striking white jurors "because of
racial reasons." In re Nelson, 146 So. 3d 176, 179 (La. 2014); see also Mazzone, supra note 220
(noting minimal sanctions for attorneys).
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Another way in which our jury-discrimination law seems to have
regressed is in how the courts understand the role of race within jury
deliberations. In Strauder, the Court had little trouble recognizing that
the reliability of a jury's verdict was necessarily suspect when black
jurors were systematically excluded. Such "jury packing" was harmful
because "[i]t is well known that prejudices often exist against particular
classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and
which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those
22 6
classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy." But
the majority view in Batson and its progeny has insisted that race and
gender are not just normatively improper categories upon which to base
juror selection, but also are "flatly irrational predictors of juror
perspective." 2 2 7 While initially proceeding from the more modest
position that an individual's race is "unrelated to his fitness as a
juror," 2 2 8

the

Court has

gone

on to reason that

race-conscious

peremptory challenges must reflect an attorney's "open hostility"
toward or irrational "hidden and unarticulated fear" of the juror's
race. 229 Accordingly, the Court refused to give Batson retroactive effect,
because there was no good reason to think "the new rule ha[d] such a
fundamental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to compel
retroactive application." 2 3 0 And when extending Batson to include
gender-based peremptory challenges, the Court rejected the "quasiempirical claim" that gender might predict jurors' views toward the
relevant issues, crediting instead "the majority of studies [that] suggest
gender plays no identifiable role in jurors' attitudes." 23 1 (Ironically,
226. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 60-61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment):
In Strauder ... we observed that the racial composition of a jury may affect the outcome
of a criminal case. . . . We thus recognized, over a century ago, the precise point that
Justice O'Connor makes today. Simply stated, securing representation of the
defendant's race on the jury may help to overcome racial bias and provide the defendant
with a better chance of having a fair trial. I do not think that this basic premise of
Strauder has become obsolete.;
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 188-91 (1989) (assuming same); Forde-Mazrui,
supra note 159, at 372-73 (arguing this understanding of bias was the core holding of Strauder);
Herman, supra note 217, at 1820 ("Strauder may legitimately be read as drawing a plausible
connection between racial discrimination in jury selection and a defendant's right to be free from
discriminatory jury verdicts.").
227. Muller, supra note 195, at 101; see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 159, at 372-73
(discussing same trend toward "colorblind" view of jurors).
228. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
229. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
230. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986). But see id. at 259 (acknowledging "the rule in
Batson may have some bearing on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial").
231. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.9 (1994).
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Batson's critics on the Court have "openly embrace[d] the idea .. . that
attorneys may rationally infer that members of discrete groups bring
)

unique perspectives to the jury." 2 32

Recognizing that racial composition of juries matters when it
comes to jury deliberations and trial outcomes does not guarantee
stronger anti-discrimination protections-the Court's immediate postStrauder jurisprudence illustrates as much-but such candor is a
necessary first step. First, as several scholars have noted,
acknowledging that "jury demographics matter" and that "different
[more diverse] juries will reach different results on the same evidence"
militates in favor of a more robust Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
jurisprudence. 2 3 3 Present enforcement of this Sixth Amendment
guarantee is "anemic" at best, 2 3 4 but if verdicts are, "at least in part,
socially rather than scientifically determined" and "experientially
constructed judgments rather than findings of immutable historical
fact," 2 3 5 the harm of unrepresentative juries-even those composed of
otherwise "impartial" jurors-is necessarily acute. 236 Second, , this
insight also provides the empirical grounding for some of the more
ambitious race-conscious proposals to counter today's Jim Crow jury; if
race has nothing to do with the behavior of real-world jurors or.trial
outcomes, it is hard to imagine the Court recognizing a "compelling
interest" advanced by any race-conscious reform. 237 To be clear, many
of these proposals (discussed below) will face an uphill fight regardless,
but demonstrating the real-world impact of unrepresentative juries on
defendants is a prerequisite for establishing the legitimacy and viability
of any such reform measures. 238
Whatever strategies to counter the Jim Crow jury one embraces,
they must represent bolder changes than those announced by the Court
in recent years. In Foster v. Chatman, the Court reviewed a Georgia
court's denial of habeas relief to Timothy Foster, a black man sentenced
to death three decades earlier by an all-white jury. 239 Foster alleged
that race discrimination tainted the selection of his petit jury, and by a
232. Muller, supra note 195, at 105.
233. Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical
Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 995-96 (1998); accordMuller, supra note 195, at 136.
234. Chernoff, supra note 182, at 149.
235. Muller, supra note 195, at 136.
236. Leipold, supranote 233, at 960-64.
237. Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 757-59 (1993).
238. See infra notes 260-267 and accompanying text; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Racial
Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704 (1995); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 159; King, supra note
237.
239. 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (2016).
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6-2 vote, the Court agreed that prosecutors were motivated in
240
substantial part by race when removing two black potential jurors.
But the Court's opinion did little to solve Batson's inadequacy, as it
turned in significant part on the uncommonly compelling evidence
supporting Foster's habeas petition. Through a series of Georgia Open
Records Act requests, Foster had obtained prosecutors' notes from the
jury selection process. 24 1 These documents, which revealed prosecutors'
color-coded system for flagging black jurors, were "as close to a 'smoking
gun' as one is likely to find in a Batson challenge." 242 In reversing the
judgment of the state habeas court, the Court "reassure[d] the public
that a blatant violation of Batson will not be ignored," but did nothing
24 3
to expand, clarify, or tweak the much-criticized Batson framework.
Peiha-Rodriguezv. Colorado broke new ground by recognizing a
defendant's constitutional right to adduce evidence that racial animus
tainted jury deliberations in his or her case. 2 4 4 But at first blush, the
opinion also appears crafted to aid only the narrowest class of
defendants. 245 Relying on the Sixth Amendment's "impartial jury"
guarantee, the Court held by a 5-3 vote that Colorado's no-impeachment
rule, which ordinarily prohibits jurors from impeaching their previous
verdicts, must yield where there is compelling evidence that racial
2 46
animus was a motivating factor in one or more jurors' deliberations.
In refreshingly frank terms, the Court acknowledged that racial bias in
the jury system is "a familiar and recurring evil" that "implicates
247 But
unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns."
4
8
perhaps because of the pervasiveness of such evil, 2 the Court quickly
cabined its holding, requiring proof of "clear statement[s] that
indicate[] .

.

. racial stereotypes or animus,"249 "the most grave and

240. Id.
241. Id. at 1744.
242. Marder, supra note 177, at 1148.
243. Id. at 1157.
244. 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 861.
247. Id. at 868.
248. The Court's reticence to make cognizable more quotidian forms of racial bias in jury
deliberations has a basic logic, of course. As Justice Powell wrote with refreshing candor in
McCleshey v. Kemp (the Term after he authored the Court's opinion in Batson), for the judiciary to
reckon directly with the stark racial disparities that pervade the criminal law would "throw[] into
serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system." 481 U.S. 279, 315
(1987). For insightful readings of the McCleskey and Batson opinions alongside one another, see
Herman, supra note 217; and Levinson, supra note 14. See also STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note
11, at 106 (arguing "the Court's reliance on Batson as a means of preventing racial discrimination
in capital sentencing was profoundly misplaced").
249. Peiia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
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serious statements of racial bias,"250 or evidence of "blatant racial
prejudice." 25 1 In other words, the Court erected precisely the sort of high
evidentiary standard that, as a practical matter, is required to prevail
on a Batson claim, and that has been required of nonwhite defendants
challenging racial bias in the jury system since the earliest days of the
Jim Crow jury. Only in this sense can the Peia-Rodriguezopinion be
characterized
as
the
work
of
"a
maturing
legal
system ...

understand[ing]

and . .. implement[ing]

the

lessons

of

history." 252
That said, Pefia-Rodriguez's acknowledgement that racial bias
in the jury system implicates unique constitutional concerns may
bolster more ambitious efforts to confront the Jim Crow jury. Consider
the Court's discussion of why Colorado's no-impeachment rule, despite
its long and venerable pedigree, must contain a Sixth Amendment
exception for evidence of racial bias in particular:
All forms of improper bias pose challenges to the trial process. But there is a sound basis
to treat racial bias with added precaution. A constitutional rule that racial bias in the
justice system must be addressed-including, in some instances, after the verdict has
been entered-is necessary to prevent systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a
confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right. 253

Such "disparate treatment" for racial bias claims, the dissent correctly
noted, is almost unheard of in the Sixth Amendment context. 254 PehaRodriguez certainly expands upon the Court's recent Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence (including recent cases rejecting a Sixth Amendment
exception to the no-impeachment rule for evidence of nonracial juror
bias) 2 5 5 and "suggest[s] that the Sixth Amendment recognizes some sort
of hierarchy of partiality or bias." 256 At minimum, the Court appears to
have recognized that the Sixth Amendment's guarantees give rise to a
compelling interest in countering the perception of a jury system
tainted by racial bias.
So what would a more robust effort to confront the Jim Crow
jury look like? In the 1990s, there was a flurry of academic interest in
(and
some
actual
experiments
with)
countering
racial
underrepresentation in the criminal jury system.257 The more
250. Id. at 864.
251. Id. at 871.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 869.
254. Id. at 879 (Alito, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 878-79 (discussing Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) and Warger v.
Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014)).
256. Id. at 883.
257. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 159, at 355 (identifying high-profile trials of O.J. Simpson
and police officers who beat Rodney King as having "greatly increased public awareness
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ambitious proposals to improve the racial representativeness of
258
"affirmative
criminal juries included the use of racial quotas,
259
to electoral
(akin
regimes
districting"
"jural
and
measures,
selection"
260
the overall
given
But
districts that group "communities of interest").
trend in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence-that is, its
application of strict scrutiny to all state-initiated racial classifications,
"benign" or otherwise-many worried that these measures may be
261
constitutionally infirm.
These concerns are certainly no less germane two decades later,
but given the deep, historical roots of racial bias and the American jury
system (and the growing evidence of how racial composition of the jury
still shapes determinations of guilt and innocence), such dramatic
experiments remain essential. Importantly, explicit race-conscious
efforts to build more representative jury panels are not wholly foreign
to American criminal justice. As Professor Jack Chin and Kendra Clark

have highlighted, 262 the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ")
allows the convening authority, when assembling the jury panel for a
court-martial, to take race and gender into account "when seeking in
good faith to make the panel more representative of the accused's race
or gender." 2 6 3 Article 25 of the UCMJ also authorizes jury quotas, of a
of. . . problem of underrepresentative juries and precipitated a crisis of confidence in the jury
system").
258. E.g., Alschuler, supra note 238 (examining several different racial quota systems).
259. E.g., Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-ConsciousJury Selection on Public Confidence in
the Fairness of Jury Proceedings:An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1177 (1994); King,
supra note 237; Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De
Medietate Linguae: A History and Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777 (1994); Tracy L.
Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 781 (1986).
260. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 159.
261. King, supra note 237, at 730; accord Forde-Mazrui, supra note 159, at 358-59 (arguing
"affirmative selection" measures face "serious and possibly fatal" obstacles under recent Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment cases, though drawing on electoral districting approaches may provide a
work around).
262. Gabriel J. Chin & Kendra Clark, Towards an Unbiased Jury: Courts-Martial and the
Right of the Accused to Jurors of One's Own Race (May 24, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
263. United States v. Riesbeck, 77 M.J. 154, 163 (C.A.A.F. 2018); accord United States v.
Smith, 27 M.J. 242, 249 (C.M.A. 1988):
Appellant is black; and if the convening authority had intentionally selected black
officers as members of the court-martial panel, Crawford's holding would apply.
Moreover, if appellant were a female whose case had been referred for trial and the
convening authority had appointed female members, the rationale of Crawford would
apply. In short, we infer from Crawford that a convening authority is not precluded by
Article 25 from appointing court-martial members in a way that will best assure that
the court-martial panel constitutes a representative cross-section of the military
community.;

United States v. Crawford, 35 C.M.R. 3 (C.M.A. 1964).
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sort: "Any enlisted member [may insist that he] not be tried by a general
or special court-martial the membership of which does riot include
enlisted members in a number comprising at least one-third of the total
membership of the court . ."264 Perhaps analogous innovations should
be imported into civilian courts. 265 If maximizing the appearance of
racial fairness in criminal jury proceedings is a compelling government
interest (as suggested in Peha-Rodriguez), and the demographic
composition of the jury has been inextricably tied to racial fairness for
the past 120 years (as suggested in Parts I and II), similar measures in
civilian courts could pass constitutional muster as "reasonably
necessary" to promote at least the perception of fairness in
contemporary criminal adjudication. 266
Recognizing the continuity between the Jim Crow jury of the
1890s and the Jim Crow jury of today brings one final point into focus.
In 1972, in a pair of fractured 4-1-4 opinions, the Court held that the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate unanimity in state
jury trials. 267 While the cases (Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson u.
264. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 825(c)(1) (West 2018) (prescribing procedures for court-martial panel
eligibility and selection).
265. Courts-martial include a number of other overlooked jury-selection rules that could more
easily be adopted by civilian courts. For example, military courts recognize the "implied bias"
doctrine, which allows the defendant to dismiss a prospective juror-even one who genuinely could
serve impartially-when "most people similarly situated to the court member would be prejudiced
or when an objective observer would have substantial doubt about the fairness of the accused's
court-martial panel." Joshua J. Wolff, Good Staff Work: Achieving Efficiency with Candid Panel
Selection Advice, ARMY LAW., Apr. 2016, at 3 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, MILITARY JUDGES'

BENCHBOOK 43 (Sept. 9, 2014)). Additionally, because military courts have "the primary
responsibility of preventing both bias and the appearance of bias involving court members," judges'
must follow the "liberal grant mandate," which provides that "in close cases military judges are
enjoined to liberally grant [defense] challenges for cause." United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274, 277
(C.A.A.F. 2007). This rule "is part of the fabric of military law." Id.
266. Here my argument merely updates that advanced two decades ago by Professor Nancy
King, who proposed that the Court explicitly recognize a "compelling interest" in maximizing the
appearance of fairness of criminal jury proceedings, using language that prefigures the snippet of
Peiia-Rodriguezhighlighted above. See King, supra note 237, at 762:
I propose a modest three-part caveat to the harsh lessons of the Court's most recent
cases: even if strict scrutiny is the appropriate method for evaluating these policies,
courts that apply such scrutiny should recognize (1) that maximizing the appearance of
fairness of criminal jury proceedings is a compelling government interest, (2) that fair
racial representation on juries is vital to the appearance of fairness in criminal jury
proceedings, and (3) that in some circumstances race-conscious selection practices may
improve, not impair, this appearance.
267. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). Eight
Justices agreed that the Sixth Amendment applied equally in state and federal courts, but only
four Justices held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial required that the jury's
vote be unanimous. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 359; id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
agreed with the dissenters that the Sixth Amendment required unanimity in federal criminal
trials, but rejected the "incorporationist" view that this requirement was equally binding on the
states, thus providing the fifth vote to allow nonunanimity in state courts. Id. at 369 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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Louisiana) were not primarily briefed or argued on Equal Protection
groundS268-instead turning on the interaction of the Sixth Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause-the Johnson
dissenters recognized that nonunanimity might exacerbate racial bias
in the jury system:
The guarantee against systematic discrimination in the selection of criminal court juries
is a fundamental of the Fourteenth Amendment. That has been the insistent message of
this Court in a line of decisions [involving race discrimination] extending over nearly a
century. The clear purpose of these decisions has been to ensure universal participation
of the citizenry in the administration of criminal justice. Yet today's judgment approves
the elimination of the one rule that can ensure that such participation will be
meaningful-the rule requiring the assent of all jurors before a verdict of conviction or
acquittal can be returned. Under today's judgment, nine jurors can simply ignore the
269
views of their fellow panel members of a different race or class.

Citing Strauder, the dissenters continued that only unanimity "can
serve to minimize the potential bigotry of those who might convict on
270
inadequate evidence, or acquit when evidence of guilt was clear."
And, importantly, "community confidence" in the jury system was
threatened when "a defendant who is conspicuously identified with a
particular group can be acquitted or convicted by a jury split along
group lines." 27 1 The plurality opinion downplayed these concerns
("[minority groups] will be present during all deliberations, and their
views will be heard") 272 , but the history and statistics provided in Part
II vindicate the dissenters' critique.
Even if nonunanimous criminal juries remain permissible under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments-and there is a strong
argument against this, given the Court's subsequent incorporation
can no longer withstand Equal
doctrine jurisprudence 27 3-they
Protection scrutiny. The closest parallel in this regard is Hunter v.
Underwood, in which the Court in 1985 unanimously invalidated a
provision of the Alabama Constitution disenfranchising felons and
those convicted of misdemeanor "crime[s] . . . involving moral
turpitude." 2 74 The Alabama measure was enacted during Alabama's
268. There was an Equal Protection claim posed in the Louisiana case, although not the one
discussed here. There, the defendant argued that Louisiana's practice of allowing nonunanimity
for some types of criminal cases, but not others (i.e., lesser felonies tried before six-person juries
and capital offenses) was a classification without rational basis. The Court had little trouble
rejecting this argument. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 368.
269. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
270. Id. at 398 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879)).
271. Id.
272. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 413.
273. See Aliza B. Kaplan & Amy Saack, Overturning Apodaca v. Oregon Should be Easy:
Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases Undermine the Credibilityof Our JusticeSystem,
95 OR. L. REV. 1 (2016).
274. 471 U.S. 222, 223, 225 (1985).
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Constitutional Convention of 1901, three years after Louisiana's
nonunanimous jury provision was approved. As the Court noted in
Hunter, the gathering "was part of a movement that swept the postReconstruction South to disenfranchise blacks." 2 75 The Court allowed

that additional motivations probably influenced the adoption of
Alabama's challenged suffrage measure-many convention delegates
were eager to strip the franchise from poor white Alabamans, too-but
nevertheless recognized that "discrimination against blacks .

.

. was a

motivating factor for the provision." 276 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court was unbothered by the argument that "there was little or no
debate at the Constitutional Convention of 1901 concerning this
[disenfranchisement] section and little or no evidence concerning its
passage." 27 7 Applying the Equal Protection framework established in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 278 the Court held that the provision violated the Fourteenth
Amendment: "[I]ts original enactment was motivated by a desire to
discriminate against blacks on account of race and the section continues
to this day to have that effect." 2 7 9 (The present-day disparate impact on
black Alabamans had been conceded. 280)
The
parallels
are
striking.
As
with
Alabama's
disenfranchisement provision, Louisiana's nonunanimous jury
provision was first adopted at a convention where "zeal for white
supremacy ran rampant." 28 1 As in Hunter, the official record from the
convention is sparse, as other concerns dominated the debate. But, in
such circumstances, the Court has instructed that "[t]he historical
background of the decision .

.

. particularly if it reveals a series of

official actions taken for invidious purposes" and "[t]he specific
sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision" are "subjects
of proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent
existed." 282 The story of the fight against the Jim Crow jury fills that

275. Id. at 229 (citing SHELDON HACKNEY, POPULISM TO PROGRESSIVISM IN ALABAMA 147

(1969); and WOODWARD, supra note 125, at 321-22).
276. Id. at 231.
277. Brief for Appellants at 12, Hunter, 471 U.S. 222 (No. 84-76), 1984 WL 565799, at *9.
278. 429 U.S. 252 (1977); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
279. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
280. Id. at 227.
281. Id. at 229. As noted earlier, see supra note 21, a trial court in Oregon has already found
that "race and ethnicity was a motivating factor in the passage of [Ballot Measure] 302-33
[adopting nonunanimous verdicts in Oregon], and that the measure was intended, at least in part,
to dampen the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon juries."
282. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68.
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gap. 2 83 The "historical background of the decision," coupled with "[t]he
specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision," make
clear that racial bias motivated Louisiana's decision to abandon
unanimity. Disparate impact is also now established: whether viewed
284
nonunanimity
from the perspective of the juror or the defendant,
continues to have a racially disparate impact today. Such overt vestiges
of Jim Crow should be struck down.
CONCLUSION
Or Louisiana voters may act on their own. In May 2018, the
Louisiana legislature endorsed a constitutional amendment-subject to
voter approval-that would abolish nonunanimous verdicts for offenses
committed on or after January 1, 2019.285 The proposal will be on the
November 2018 ballot. 28 6 Although the vast majority of Louisiana's
sixty-four district attorneys opposed the proposal, the politically
powerful Louisiana District Attorneys Association remained neutral;
the organization does not take a public stance on important matters
287
unless its membership is unanimous.
2 88
the unexpected
Although initially "seen as a long shot,"
passage of the proposal emerged from years of agitation and organizing

283. A possible rejoinder is that although a discriminatory motive may have influenced the
initial adoption of nonunanimous verdicts in Louisiana, subsequent constitutional conventions (in
1913, 1921, and 1974) readopting the measure-and partial amelioration of the rule by shifting
from 9-3 verdicts to 10-2 verdicts in 1974-were not so infected with racial prejudice. Notably,
though, the Court rejected a variation of this argument in Hunter. There, Alabama argued that
"events occurring in the succeeding 80 years"-specifically, court rulings narrowing the scope of
the disenfranchisement provision-"had legitimated the provision." Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233. The
Court's answer: "Without deciding whether § 182 would be valid if enacted today without any
impermissible motivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was motivated by a desire
to discriminate against blacks on account of race and the section continues to have that effect." Id.;
see also United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 728 (1992):
[A] State does not discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and
practices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster segregation.
Thus, we have consistently asked whether existing racial identifiability is attributable
to the State and examined a wide range of factors to determine whether the State has
perpetuated its formerly de jure segregation in any facet of its institutional system.
(citations omitted).
284. Muller, supra note 195, at 118-19 (exploring confusion in Court's jurisprudence as to who
is the "victim" of a Batson violation-the defendant, the excluded juror, or the community).
285. 2018 La. Act 722.
286. Gordon Russell, Momentum Builds to Put Unanimous-Jury Issue on Ballot; Applause
La.)
(Apr.
25,
2018),
ADVOCATE
(New
Orleans,
Erupts
as Bill
Advances,
https://www.theadvocate.comlbaton-rouge/news/politics/legislature/article-fb0bel42-48a7-1le8a628-23e6e2ee3226.html [https://perma.cc/PS8X-2W9L].
287. Id.
288. Id.
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by activists, scholars, legal workers, defendants, and the formerly
incarcerated. Notably, momentum for the bill grew amidst a political
climate-in both Louisiana and across the United States-in which the
operation of U.S. criminal law has once again become a focus for racial
justice advocates. In 2016, Louisiana witnessed its largest mass
protests in decades following the police killing of black Baton Rouge
resident Alton Sterling; 289 in 2017, pushed by a broad coalition
including racial justice groups, the state passed a series of criminaljustice reforms that have dislodged Louisiana from its perennial status
as the United States' (and the world's) "prison capital." 290
Unsurprisingly, race played a salient role in the legislative debate
surrounding the constitutional amendment, too: a pivotal moment came
when a prominent white opponent of the measure, to the outrage of
supporters, blithely conceded that nonunanimity was a "vestige( ] of
slavery.... [I]t is what it is."291 The proposal eventually garnered
bipartisan backing, but it would have fallen short of the two-thirds vote
needed to advance to the November ballot if not for the unanimous
support of the state's Legislative Black Caucus. 2 92
This Article has sought to provide historical context for this
moment, not only for the existence of nonunanimous verdicts in
Louisiana, but also for the manifold ways in which race enters into our
jury system and the efforts taken outside of the courtroom to reform the
institution. Activists today, like those a century before them, are
emphasizing that the criminal law plays a central role in perpetuating
and deepening racial subordination. And the jury box, just as it was in
the late nineteenth century, has become a site of social contestation.'
Whether Louisiana voters approve or reject the constitutional
289. See Campbell Robertson & Frances Robles, Escalating Discord Between the Police and
Protesters StrainsBaton Rouge, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2016, at A14.
290. John Simerman, 'PrisonCapital'NoMore: Louisiana Sheds Long-Held Title, but Remains
Above U.S. IncarcerationRate, ADVOCATE (June 20, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/
baton rouge/news/article_65844992-6b53-11e8-ac2d-97c9311bl424.html [https://perma.cc/5EZGPP9M].
291. James Gill, Louisiana's ConsideringUnanimous Jury Shift as Other CountriesAbandon
Practice, ADVOCATE (New Orleans, La) (May 6, 2018), https://www.theadvocate.com/new-orleans/
opinion/james-gill/article 50la5382-4eel-11e8-b429-d35c9544b293.html [https://perma.cc/9JTJRCQ6].
292. See SBS 3rd Reading and Final Passage: SB 243 by Morrell, LA. STATE SENATE (Apr. 4,
2018,
4:54:44
PM),
http://www.legis.1a.gov/LegisNiewDocument.aspx?d=1083013
[https://perma.cc/T6K4-B8TD] (Louisiana Senate roll call vote: 27-10-2); SBS 3rd Reading and
Final Passage: SB 243 by Morrell, LA. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (May 14, 2018, 5:13:56 PM),
http://www.legis.1a.gov/Legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1096716
[https://perma.cc/RNE4-B2C6]
(Louisiana House roll call vote: 84-15-6); Members, LA. LEGIS. BLACK CAUCUS,
http://www.llbc.louisiana.gov/index-members.aspx
(last
visited
Sept.
17,
2018)
[https://perma.cc/6H3D-7W2Q] (showing nine House members and twenty-five Senate members of
the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus).
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amendment, it would be a mistake to view the measure simply as a
referendum on an unusual quirk of one state's criminal procedure.
Rather, it represents the resumption of a political struggle that would
be altogether legible to Louis Martinet, Homer Plessy, and the other
activists of the Comit6 des Citoyens a century ago.
In April 2017, New Orleans contractors wearing face masks and
bulletproof vests removed a massive stone obelisk celebrating the White
League's violent 1874 insurrection against Louisiana's Reconstruction
government. 293 In the following weeks, three other Confederate
monuments came down, as well, leaving behind empty pedestals at
prominent locations throughout the city. 2 9 4 The monuments' removal
295 but rather
was not just the work of enlightened municipal officials,
the

culmination

of

decades

of

activism,

296

and

represents

a

demonstration of grassroots "collective will to address entrenched
systemic oppression." 297 But other, less tangible relics from the same
era remain.
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